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SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
Civil society has become a vital actor in the litigation of the African human rights 
system, thereby re-ordering African politics. Not only do its representatives act as 
litigants, but they also appear before the African judicial and quasi-judicial bodies as 
amici curiae. The present study therefore explores the process, practice and impact 
of the amicus device in the litigation before the African Commission, the African Court 
and the African Children’s Rights Committee. Despite the commitment of these bodies 
to a bilateral model of litigation, private actors as well as states have nevertheless 
begun to forge for themselves a role as non-parties in their litigation. 
However, the study notes that the amicus regulatory frameworks of the African judicial 
and quasi-judicial bodies are underspecified, incomprehensive and therefore 
inadequate for the effective management and control of third parties. Proper regulation 
of amicus participation would ensure that the interests of third parties in ventilating 
their opinions and the procedural rights of the parties are balanced. Regulation would 
also ensure that amici curiae do not place themselves in the way of a timely, cost-
effective and efficient resolution of disputes.  
The present study establishes that the amicus curiae has two principal functions in the 
African human rights system: First, it assists the African judicial and quasi-judicial 
mechanisms with factual information and legal arguments in the resolution of disputes. 
Despite the fact that amicus participation in the African system remains modest, a 
review of relevant cases shows that the African Commission and the African Court 
have begun to rely on amicus submissions in decision-making. The African Children’s 
Committee merely recapitulated or summarised the submissions filed by the amicus 
curiae without referencing them at the evaluative part of the opinion, making the impact 
of the submission difficult to ascertain.  
Second, the study establishes that amici curiae may help to overcome the democratic 
legitimacy deficit that haunts the African judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, by 
introducing the diverse views of African audiences into the decision-making processes 
of these mechanisms. However, the study notes that at present, the majority of third 
party intervenors before the African system are non-African NGOs which are naturally 
ill-suited to represent the interests of the African publics. African human rights civil 
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society should therefore stand at the cutting edge of this third-party initiative to 
alleviate these ‘outsider concerns’. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Background of the study  
There are presently three major regional human rights systems in the world: the 
European, the Inter-American and the African human rights systems. Of the three, the 
African human rights system is the youngest.1 The normative cornerstones of this 
system comprise a set of three treaties adopted under the aegis of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU). These are the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter);2 the Protocol to the 
African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa (African Women’s Protocol);3 and 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (the African Children’s 
Charter).4 Collectively, these instruments are referred to as the ‘African Bill of Rights,’ 
perhaps after the International Bill of Rights.5 The African Charter is the principal 
human rights protection instrument in Africa.6  
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Commission), 
the only interpretive body originally established under the African Charter, which 
became operational in 1987; the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the 
African Court), which came into being later in 2004 following the adoption of the 
additional Protocol to the African Charter;7 and the fairly obscure African Committee 
of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (the African Children’s Rights 
Committee) which, was inaugurated in 2001, are charged with the responsibility of 
interpreting and applying the rights proclaimed in these treaties. These collegial 
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies act as external correctives for compliance with these 
                                                          
1 C Heyns et al ‘A schematic comparison of regional human rights systems: an update’ (2006) 3/4 SUR: 
International Journal on Human Rights 162. See also F Viljoen ‘From a cat into a lion? an overview of 
the progress and challenges of the African human right system at the African Commission’s 25-year 
mark’ (2013) 17/1 Law, Democracy & Development 299. 
2 Reprinted in C Heyns & M Killander Compendium of key human rights documents of the African Union 
(2006) 2. 
3 Ibid. 62. 
4 Ibid. 77. 
5 F Viljoen & A Abebe ‘The participation of amicus curiae before regional human rights bodies in Africa’ 
(2014) 58/1 Journal of African Law 22. 
6 AA Yusuf ‘The progressive development of peoples’ Rights in the African Charter and in the case law 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in F Lenzerini & AF Vrdoljak (eds) 
International law for common goods: normative perspectives on human rights, culture and nature (2014) 
41. 
7 Heyns & Killander (n 2 above) 41. 
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rights treaties by African states. In combination, the growing jurisprudence of these 
mechanisms clarifies the applicable norms and contributes towards the development 
of a pan-African human rights jus commune.  
Moreover, several decisions delivered by these supranational institutions have been 
acknowledged as bearing considerable potential to offer remediation to victims of 
human rights abuses and prevent future violations on the continent.8 These bodies 
have set themselves an ambitious task of stemming the tidal wave of human rights 
abuses, strengthening the rule of law, and thereby bending the arch of Africa’s 
chequered history of human rights violations towards justice. It is hoped that their 
efforts will help in the attainment of the democratic values that constitute the professed 
ends of the African polity, as well as help to build the continent’s ‘public order’, in which 
the ideal of human dignity is relentlessly pursued and effectively approximated.  
The African Commission, the African Court and the African Children’s Rights 
Committee collectively contribute towards the construction of a new jus gentium of the 
twenty-first century, in terms of which an individual can no longer suffer impotently and 
in silence the decisions or actions of his or her government, unable to vindicate his or 
her rights. However, the notable progress made by these mechanisms would not have 
been possible without the vital input by public-spirited Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) which litigate before them. In this regard, Mbelle points out that 
the jurisprudence of the African Commission, ‘is undoubtedly a product of the efforts 
of NGOs to take what they consider will be precedent-setting cases.’9 
Motala concurs that NGOs have made a vital contribution to the development of the 
jurisprudence of the African Commission ‘in relation to almost every substantive 
provision of the Charter.’10 The elaboration of norms in the region has been important 
                                                          
8 R Murray & E Mottershaw ‘Mechanisms for the implementation of decisions of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2014) 36/2 Human Rights Quarterly 350. 
9 N Mbelle ‘The role of Non-Governmental Organisations and National Human Rights Institutions at the 
African Commission in MD Evans & R Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: 
the system in practice 1986 – 2006 (2008) 309. See also F Viljoen ‘Promising profiles: an interview with 
the four new members of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights’ (2006) 6/1 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 244; R Murray ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Right 1987-
2000: An overview of its progress and problems’ (2001) 1/1 African Human Rights Law Journal 2. 
10 Z Motala ‘Non-Governmental Organisations in the African human rights systems’ in MD Evans & R 
Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: the system in practice 1986 – 2000 
(2002) 257; SBO Gutto ‘Non-Governmental Organisations, peoples’ participation and the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: emerging challenges to regional protection of human 
rights’ (1992) Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 42. 
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to those who have sought to move international human rights instruments from 
abstract theory to practice.11 Civil society acts not only as petitioners before the African 
human rights judicial and quasi-judicial bodies but also intervenes as amici curiae – 
the focus of the present study. Since the 1990s, the amicus curiae has become an 
important term in the lexicon of international human rights adjudication. It has recently 
found its way into the African human rights discourse. 
1.2 Objective of the study and research questions 
 
Through a critical examination and nuanced systematisation of applicable rules and 
practices, the present study considers and appraises the participation of amici curiae 
before the African Commission, the African Court and the African’s Children’s 
Committee. According to Dolidze, scholarship is yet to theorise the role and 
significance of amici curiae in international judicial decision-making.12 This lack of 
theorisation is more acute in the African human rights system, where the general role 
of civil society before the interpretive bodies of this system still remains under-
researched.  
 
The present thefore study attempts to bridge this gap in the literature by developing a 
clear and coherent theory about amicus participation in the African human rights 
system. It also answers the call for an evidence-based work on the question of amicus 
participation of amici curiae before the African system and contributes to current 
debates about the function of amici curiae in international adjudication. The main 
research question in this study is therefore: What is the role and significance of amici 
curiae participation in the African human rights system? A number of specific 
subsidiary questions will be dealt with in an endeavour to address the key research 
question, namely: 
 
a. What is the place of amici curiae in the bilateral framework of international human 
rights litigation? 
 
                                                          
11 J Sarkin ‘The African Commission on Human and People's Rights and the future African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights: comparative lessons from the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 
18/3 South African Journal of International Affairs 285-286. 
12 A Dolidze ‘Making international property law: the role of amici curiae in international judicial decision-
making’ (2013) 40 Syracuse Journal of International and Comparative Law 121.  
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b. Do the regulatory regimes for amicus intervention of the African Commission, 
African Court and the African Children’s Rights Committee allow for optimal and 
effective amicus participation? 
 
c. To what extent does the filing of amicus briefs in the litigation of the interpretive 
organs of the African human rights assist in the process of judicial deliberation and 
analysis? 
 
d. To what extent has the amicus device assisted in proffering the interpretive organs 
of the African human rights system with additional information and legal 
perspectives not contained in the direct parties’ pleadings and/or submissions as 
well as in buttressing the parties’ pleadings or arguments? 
 
e. In what ways do amici curiae contribute to the amelioration of democratic deficit 
and enhance the sociological legitimacy of the African human rights system? 
 
1.3 Conceptual and contextual clarifications 
 
For purposes of contextualising and facilitating a better understanding of this study, 
certain terms and concepts that have been used in the title and body of the study are 
clarified, starting with the concept at the heart of the study, namely, amicus curiae. 
The concept of amicus curiae is amorphous in structure does not lend itself to a precise 
definition. As Bellhouse and Lavers write, ‘there can be few technical legal terms or 
definitions as unhelpful as amicus curiae… Its meaning is still imprecise and 
obscure.’13 Despite this, in Latin etymology, this concept has been loosely translated 
to mean a ‘friend of the court’. 
The foregoing defition has been criticised as idealistic and ‘deceptively simple.’14 This 
is because in some cases, the motive of intervention by the amicus is inconsitent with 
its conventional role of assiting the court. For instance, it often intervenes as a friend 
of a party, helping one party against the other. Despite these conceptual controversies, 
the traditional understanding of the concept of amicus curiae as a servant of the court 
                                                          
13 J Bellhouse & A Lavers ‘The modern amicus curiae: a role in arbitration?’ (2004) 23 Civil Justice 
Quarterly 187.  
14 Ibid. 
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is still prevalent in literature and judicial pronouncements. The International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Tribunal (the ICSID Tribunal) has helpfully 
stated that an amicus curiae is: 
recognized in certain legal systems and more recently in a number of international proceedings. 
In such cases, a non-party to the dispute, as ‘a friend,’ offers to provide the court or tribunal its 
special perspectives, arguments, or expertise on the dispute, usually in the form of a written 
amicus curiae brief or submission.15 
The modern Law Lexicon defines an amicus curiae as ‘one, who volunteers or on 
invitation of the Court, instructs the Court on a matter of law concerning which the 
latter is doubtful or mistaken, or informs him on facts, a knowledge of which is 
necessary to a proper disposition of the case’.16 The Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
this term as ‘[a] person who is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is 
requested by the court to file a brief in the action because that person has a strong 
interest in the subject matter.’17 The lack of a standard definition of amicus curiae is 
due to the evolution and development of this concept in different legal environments 
and systems  over many years.18 
Although there may be conceptual linkages and overlaps in relation to various roles, 
a distinction must be made between an amicus on the one hand and related or cognate 
concepts such as a witness or expert, on the other. Moreover, although an amicus 
intervention is a third-party procedure to all intents and purposes, it must not be 
conflated or confused with the classical third-party intervention, with which it cohabits 
the same conceptual space. While intervening third parties are mostly parties to the 
treaty with the necessary locus standi and intervene in proceedings to protect their 
right(s) or legal interest(s) which are likely to be affected by the expected judgment of 
the court, an amicus curiae may not have any specific legal interest in the dispute but 
                                                          
15 Aguas Argentinas SA and Others v Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus curiae, 
ICSID Case no. ARB/03/19, para, 19 May 2005. 
16 PR Aiyar The Law Lexicon (1997) 102. See also ER Beckwith & R Sobernheim ‘Amicus curiae: 
minister of justice’ (1948) 17/1 Fordham Law Review 38. See also LS Simard ‘An empirical study of 
amici curiae in federal court: a fine balance of access, efficiency, and adversarialism’ (2008) 27 Review 
of Litigation 675. 
17 BA Garner Black's Law Dictionary (2004) 93. 
18 SC Mohan ‘The amicus curiae: friends no more?’ (2010) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 353. 
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nonetheless intervenes to bring information that is relevant for the resolution of the 
matter before the court.19  
In other words, while the role of a third-party intervenor is to protect its own legal 
interest(s) in the proceedings, generally, the role of the amicus curiae is to assist the 
court. More critically, a classical third-party intervenor is entitled to have its 
submissions considered by the court while an amicus curiae is not so entitled.20 Since 
an amicus is not party to the proceedings before the court, it is not bound by the 
decision of the court on the dispute (although it is affected by it), and therefore it can 
re-litigate the same case without being caught by the principle of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel. In this way, the amicus procedure creates an opportunity for the 
court or tribunal to have a re-look at the issues.21 
It is important to be critical of terminology, because it may also obfuscate the juridical 
character of amici curiae. In some jurisdictions, such as the European human rights 
system, the term ‘third party intervention’ is preferred over ‘amicus curiae.’22 However, 
this linguistic variation appears not to be of any material consequence.  This study 
uses the functional approach and considers an amicus curiae as all forms of 
participation where a non-party files observations or statements to a proceeding with 
a view to helping the court to dispose of a case.23 
Apart from its noted informational role, conventional wisdom holds that an amicus also 
represents public interest. The term public interest frequently appears alongside 
amicus curiae and seems to be at the base of its functions. Just as in the case of 
amicus curiae, no precise definition of public interest has so far been comprehensively 
developed within the law.24 It has become commonplace among scholars who have 
studied the public interest law phenomenon to throw up their hands to the sky when it 
comes to constructing a comprehensive and precise definition of the concept. Many 
                                                          
19 PJ Sands & R Mackenzie ‘International courts and tribunals’ amicus curiae’ in R Wolfrum (ed.) Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2011) 1. 
20 A Wiik Amicus curiae participation before international courts and tribunals (2018) 163 – 164. 
21 See Stryker v Crane 123 US. 527 at 540 & Munoz v County of Imperial, 677 f.2D 816.  
22 Viljoen & Abebe (n 5 above) 24. 
23 Compare Astrid Wiik (n 20 above) 33 – 35. 
24 MF Henríquez-Prieto & P Miranda-Nigro ‘Amicus curiae and ecosystem services: on public interest 
interventions to help resolve environmental controversies’ (2017) 36/2 Journal of Energy & Natural 
Resources Law 209. 
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have a predilection to follow the lead of the US Supreme Court Justice Stevens who 
famously stated about pornography: ‘I know it when I see it’.25  
Despite the aforesaid conceptual difficulties, Justice Hantke-Domas has sought to 
contribute to the understanding of the concept of public interest by describing it as ‘the 
motivation of public officials in exercising their functions to achieve the common good 
of the collective, by improving democracy and social and economic welfare.’26 For 
purposes of this study, the concept of public interest includes all those interests that 
extend beyond those attaching to the parties to the dispute and have a bearing on the 
local, the national or the global community at large.27 From this definition, one is able 
to deduce that amici curiae should be functionally equivalent to public officials who are 
inspired purely to achieve a common good. According to Hantke-Domas, an amicus 
intervention should be motivated by altruistic desires and motivations, solely to protect 
common societal interests such as respect for human rights.28  
However, Hantke-Domas’ understanding of the purpose of intervention is limited in 
that it excludes groups that seek to advance their own constitutive claims and 
perceptions about ‘good’ law in line with their own priorities. For Jaffe, public interest 
refers to an aggregation of individual interests which the intervening party shares ‘with 
millions of others.’29 Similarly, the Public Law Project has noted that ‘[t]here is no easy 
definition of what this means. In relation to litigation, we have used it to refer to cases 
which raise a serious issue which affects or may affect the public generally or a section 
of it.’30 Public interest is associated with access to justice and the advancement of a 
common vision for public good or benefit.31 Vague elements at the core of public 
                                                          
25 E Rekosh ‘Who defines the public interest?: public interest law strategies in Central and Eastern 
Europe’ (2005) 2/2 SUR: International Journal on Human Rights 167. 
26 M Hantke-Domas ‘Public Interest’ in A Marciano & GB Ramello (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics (2016) 1. 
27 Wiik (n 20 above) 53. See also DM Gruner ‘Accounting for the public interest in international 
arbitration: the need for procedural and structural reform’ (2003) 41/3 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 929 – 932, stating that ‘public interest refers to a set of values and norms that serve as ends 
towards which community strikes’. 
28 M Hantke-Domas (n 26 above) 1. 
29 LL Jaffe Judicial control of administrative action (1965) 484. 
30 JUSTICE Report: ‘A Matter of Public Interest: reforming the law and practice on interventions in public 
interest cases’ (1996) 4-5. Available at: https://booking.publiclawproject.org.uk/old-
site/downloads/PublicInterest.pdf (accessed 07 July 2018). 
31 A Southworth ‘What is public interest law? empirical perspectives on an old question’ (2013) 62/2 
DePaul Law Review 495. 
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interest law, especially the notion of underrepresentation, carry the possibility of the 
phrase’s potentially extensive application.32  
1.4  An outline of the research methodology  
 
The present study is predominantly empirical and uses the qualitative research 
methodology. The objective is to search for empirical explanations for amicus 
interventions and the effect of such interventions in the African human rights system. 
A qualitative research method is ‘… an inquiry process of understanding based on 
distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explores a social or human problem, 
based on a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of 
informants, and conducted in a natural setting.’33 A qualitative inquiry seeks ‘to 
discover, explain, and generate ideas or theories about the phenomenon under 
investigation; [and] to understand and explain social patterns (the “how” questions)’.34 
 
The qualitative research technique allows for a deeper probing of the latent 
motivations, reasons and attitudes underlying particular practices or trends in a 
phenomenon being explored. Empirical approaches in legal discourses underline the 
fact that law is an applied discipline and, as Ulen notes, ‘empirical work is an absolutely 
vital part of the development of a mature legal science.’35 In many cases, legal 
theoretical and doctrinal postulations rest – in some instances precariously so – upon 
empirical assumptions and presuppositions.36 The appetite for empirical analysis has 
developed rapidly among legal writers, and empirical research has emerged as an 
important subgenre of legal scholarship.37  
 
Some writers are beginning to use interviews to assess the substantive impact of 
amicus briefs.38 There is a new appreciation among these writers that amicus 
                                                          
32 Ibid. 497. 
33 JW Creswell Qualitative inquiry and research design: choosing among five approaches (2007)15. 
34 S Hesse-Biber & P Leavy The practice of qualitative research (2006) 49. 
35 TS Ulen ‘A Nobel Prize in legal science: theory, empirical work, and the scientific method in the study 
of law’ (2002) 4 University of Illinois Law Review 900. 
36 M Heise ‘The past, present, and future of empirical legal scholarship: judicial decision making and 
the new empiricism’ (2002) 4 University of Illinois Law Review 827. 
37 TJ Miles & CR Sunstein ‘The new legal realism’ (2008) 75/2 University of Chicago Law Review 833. 
38 For instance, AO Larsen ‘The trouble with amicus facts’ (2014) 100/8 Virginia Law Review 1757–818; 
J Perkins ‘Why file? organized interests and amicus briefs in state courts of last resort’ (2018) 39/2 
Justice System Journal 39–53. 
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participation lies at the intersection between normative theory and empirical social 
science.39 Collins Jr writes that a qualitative inquiry in the context of amicus 
participation allows for a ‘rich understanding of how amicus submissions shape the 
legal doctrines enunciated in the court’s opinions…’40 Indeed, epistemological 
discussions about amicus intervention are not limited to abstract metaphysical 
reasoning or ideology, normative arguments and legal theories and doctrines, but can 
also be reduced to practical questions that are capable of being empirically framed. It 
is for this reason that the present study transcends mere theoretical debate by looking 
into the facts and evidence in order to provide a firm basis upon which theoretical 
canons about amicus participation in the African system might be established.  
 
However, mainstream research in this area has predominantly adopted an 
observational approach by analysing the factors that correlate with the presence, or 
rate of amicus briefs filed in cases.41 Collins Jr correctly encourages writers to move 
beyond observational studies on amicus participation and focus more on surveys and 
interviews.42  While much critical insight into amicus activity has been gained from 
observational studies, these studies have also constrained our ability to probe issues 
that are not readily discernible through observational inquiries.43 For instance, writers 
have persuasively established that amici curiae strive to influence case outcomes. 
However, it is not completely clear what this means. Nor is it clear whether or not 
amicus intervenors view influencing case outcomes in the same way.44  
 
Some may perceive influence in terms of the development of the court’s ideological 
direction. For others, influence may be gauged in terms of citation counts of the brief 
in the decision or having arguments contained in the brief incorporated in the decision 
                                                          
39 PM Collins Jr. ‘The use of amicus briefs’ (2018) 14 Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences 4.11. 
40 PM Collins Jr. ‘Interest groups and their influence on judicial policy’ in KT McGuire (ed) New directions 
in judicial politics (2012) 234. 
41 See for instance, PM Collins & LA McCarthy ‘Friends and Interveners: interest group litigation in a 
comparative context’ (2017) 5/1 Journal of Law and Courts 55 - 80; SA Gleason & C Provost 
‘Representing the states before the U.S. Supreme Court: state amicus brief participation, the policy-
making environment, and the Fourth Amendment’ (2016) 46/2 The Journal of Federalism 248–273; TG 
Hansford ‘Information provision, organizational constraints, and the decision to submit an amicus curiae 
brief in a U.S. Supreme Court Case’ (2004) 57/2 Political Research Quarterly 219 – 230. 
42 Collins Jr (n 39 above) 4.3. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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of the court.45 For these writers, when the tribunal’s decision incorporates the 
arguments made by amici curiae in its decision or uses the language found in the 
amicus brief, that brief has had an impact on the opinion, contributing towards the 
development of the law.46  
 
It has been argued that ‘[t]he incidence of quotations could yield a truer approximation 
of the extent to which the Court has actually relied on amicus arguments, particularly 
when assessed on a relative basis over time.’47 Still, other amicus intervenors may 
care only about developing precedents or generating media coverage for their 
cause.48 Although the use of observational research designs may undoubtedly 
contribute to this conversation, these types of issues may better be dealt with through 
surveys and interviews with the filers and recipients of amicus briefs.49  
 
In carrying out the present study, the following research participants were interviewed: 
members of the African Commission; judges of the African Court; members of the 
Court’s Registry; members of the African Children’s Committee, an official of its 
secretariat and members of civil society. The interviews were conducted between April 
2017 and February 2018. The officials of the aforesaid tribunals have been included 
in this study as research participants because most of the previous studies conducted 
on amicus curiae participation have been undertaken from the point of view of the 
NGOs seeking to influence case outcomes and hardly anything empirical has been 
reported on the tribunals’ perspectives. 
 
It is thus important to gain better insights on the process by which briefs are processed 
or triaged by the tribunals. This will help to empirically establish how African judicial 
and quasi-judicial bodies perceive and deal with amicus interventions in practice, as 
well as how they may be influenced by amicus briefs, at least potentially, in judicial 
analysis. Although there is a broad consensus among writers that there is a growing 
                                                          
45 M Sjöholm Gender sensitive norm interpretation by regional human rights law systems (2017) 160. 
See also WM Landes et al ‘Judicial influence: a citation analysis of federal courts of appeals judges’ 
(1998) 27/2 Journal of Legal Studies 271-332. 
46 P Collins et al ‘The Influence of amicus curiae briefs on U.S. Supreme Court opinion content’ (2015) 
49/4 Law & Society Review 920. 
47 JD Kearny & TW Merrill ‘The influence of amicus curiae briefs on the Supreme Court’ (2000) 148/3 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 578. 
48 Collins Jr. (n 39 above) 4.3. 
49 Ibid. 
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influence of amicus briefs in the litigation of international courts, measuring the impact 
of the contribution of these briefs on the courts’ reasoning is a particularly difficult 
exercise.50  
 
As already indicated, impact studies rely predominantly on citation counts contained 
in courts’ decisions as an indicator of whether or not the court has relied on such a 
contribution in its decisions.51 The number of citations a brief receives is read as the 
measure of its effectiveness.52 Citation counts are often considered a useful measure 
in that a judge’s decision to cite a brief shows that, at the very least, some aspects of 
the brief were considered relevant for judicial analysis.53 It might be that the brief 
assisted in propelling an opinion, or provided a point of view against which the judge 
could develop his own line of thought. In either case, it can be rationally argued that 
citation counts are a helpful indicator for the usefulness of the brief.54 
  
While in some cases courts have explicitly acknowledged the usefulness of filed briefs, 
and scholars have correctly taken this as proof of influence, this approach may, in 
some cases, be inadequate to precisely capture the impact that an amicus brief may 
have had in judicial analysis. Indeed, in some cases counts of citations in decisions 
may conceivably underrepresent the influence.55 For Hafemeister and Melton, 
‘[c]itations may be mere makeweight or post hoc rationalizations for views originating 
from other, unexpressed sources.’56 It may also be plausible to suspect that judges 
rely on or cite amicus briefs that support their propositions and ignore them when they 
advocate a contrary position.57 To this end, it is necessary to obtain discursive 
perspectives from officials tasked with processing and triaging briefs themselves as to 
what impact, if any, filed briefs have had on their decisions.  
                                                          
50 D Shelton The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings, 
(1994) 88/4 American Journal of International Law 635. See Sjöholm (n 45 above) 160. 
51 RG Roesch et al ‘Social science and the courts: the role of amicus curiae briefs’ (1991) 15/1 Law and 
Human Behavior 3. 
52 BD Harper ‘The effectiveness of state-filed amicus briefs at the United States Supreme Court’ 
(2014)16/5 Journal of Constitutional Law 1506.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. See also CR Tremper ‘The high road to the bench: presenting research findings in appellate 
briefs’ in GB Melton (ed.) Reforming the law: Impact of child development research (1987) 200. 
56 TL Hafemeister & GB Melton ‘The impact of social science research on the judiciary’ in GB Melton 
(ed.) Reforming the law: Impact of child development research (1987) 33. 
57 Roesch et al (n 51 above) 3. 
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In addition, the way in which a judge privately or cognitively forms an opinion on a 
case can be inscrutable from the outsider’s standpoint. Therefore, a judge may draw 
inspiration, stimulation, or guidance from an amicus brief without expressly 
acknowledging or referencing it in the judgment. Obtaining the views of members of 
the tribunals on amicus briefs will help provide vital empirical insights so that reality 
can replace conjecture and facts replace claims. As already indicated, NGOs and 
other activist voluntary associations were also interviewed for this study. I interviewed 
both those with a history of involvement in the African human rights system as amicus 
curiae and those that have not yet intervened in the litigation of these bodies, but have 
the desire and necessary resource capacity to do so in future.  
 
From the perspective of civil society, the research sought to establish their attitudes 
towards the filing of amicus briefs before the interpretive bodies of the African human 
rights systems: their motivations for filing briefs; the problems they encounter; and 
suggestions on how such problems, if any, could be addressed. The modus operandi 
for the qualitative research deployed in this study is in-depth, semi-structured and 
open-ended interviews. This approach was preferred in this study because it allows 
for a flexible and conversational engagement. It offers the researcher a distinct 
opportunity to formulate and ask impromptu questions during the course of the 
interview in order to follow up information leads, emergent ideas, and themes.58  
 
This research approach allows interviewees to focus on matters that they consider 
relevant to themselves.59 It also enables research participants to answer questions 
with more nuance than would have been possible if a different research methodology 
were to be used. According to Jones, this research approach is important in that:  
 
for one to understand other persons’ constructions of reality, we would do well to ask them … 
and to ask them in such a way that they can tell us in their own terms (rather than those imposed 
                                                          
58 H Alshenqeeti ‘Interviewing as a data collection method: a critical review’ (2014)/ 3/1 English 
Linguistics Research 40. See also Z Dörnyei research methods in applied linguistics: quantitative 
qualitative, and mixed methodologies (2007) 136. 
59 E de Leeuw ‘Self-administered questionnaires and standardized interviews’ in P Alasuutari et al (eds) 
Sage Handbook of social science research methods (2008) 317. 
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rigidly and a priori by ourselves) and in a depth which addresses the rich context that is the 
substance of their meanings.60 
 
Qualitative research methodology is particularly effective when the interpretivist 
approach is adopted, when the researcher aspires to gain an understanding of socially 
constructed life-realities and human action in given contexts.61 It also enables the 
researcher to obtain as much relevant information as possible, while simultaneously 
allowing for the comparison of the results derived from individual interviewees, as well 
those obtained from specific courts.62 In the present study, the researcher had face-
to-face interactions with research participants and in some cases used self-completion 
(or self-administered) questionnaires, telephone or Skype, where face-to-face 
meetings proved impracticable.  
 
In addition to interviews, and where possible, the texts of filed briefs were also relied 
upon, comparing their language and analytic approaches with those deployed in 
relevant decisions; checking if traces of opinions of intervenors could be found in 
resultant judgments. Based on such comparisons, preliminary observations or 
hypotheses were formed. As pointed out earlier, many writers hold the view that when 
a tribunal adopts language used in an amicus brief in its decisions, that fact attests to 
the fact that the brief in question influenced the tribunals’ opinion.63  
 
By triangulating among the diverse methods and approaches to amicus influence, we 
can gain useful insights into and comprehension of this important subject. However, it 
is also critical to note that copies of filed briefs are publicly accessible only if the 
intervening organisations publish them online on their respective websites or when 
directly sourced from the author where possible. Since this is not the case in relation 
to many of the briefs filed before the African regional judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, 
the briefs filed could not be fully and systematically analysed. In addition, amicus briefs 
by individuals are typically not publicly available and are difficult to obtain. 
 
                                                          
60 S Jones ‘Depth Interviewing’ in C Seale (ed.) Social research methods: a reader (2004) 258.  
61 U Jaremba & E Mak ‘Interviewing judges in the transnational context’ (2014) 2 Law & Method 8. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Landes et al (n 45 above) 271– 332; See also Collins Jr (n 46 above) 920. 
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1.5 Ethical considerations 
 
Having outlined the methodological approaches adopted in this study, it remains to 
briefly touch upon ethical considerations. In this regard, it is important to note that the 
interviewees are elite people who are legally trained and capable of averting any harm 
that may emanate from their participation in the research. It must also be stated that 
in carrying out the interviews, the researcher was open to rendering anonymous any 
opinions of this elite group, if requested, to ensure that such opinions were confidential 
and therefore did not impact on their reputations. The decision on confidentiality was 
left to the interviewees, who were invited to decide for themselves whether they want 
their views to be anonymous or not. In addition, passages of this text where their 
opinions are quoted were sent to the interviewees to cross-check if such opinions had 
been correctly captured, and whether on reflection, they were still willing to be 
identified in the study or now preferred anonymity. 
 
1.6 Structure of the study 
 
This study is divided into seven chapters that follow a schematic and logical 
progression. The present chapter provides a brief background to the study. It also 
identifies the issues that will be investigated or considered, suggests the significance 
of the study, and describes the methodology used. The chapter also clarifies some of 
the rlevant concepts and contexts and ends by setting out the limitations of the study. 
 
Chapter 2 challenges the adversarialism that is hard-wired in traditional international 
adjudication and proposes that the international judicial decision-making process must 
be accommodative to the public interest represented by amici curiae. It also stresses 
the fact that the participation of private actors like amici curiae in international litigation 
mirrors a broader phenomenon or practice of the involvement of non-state actors in 
international law. 
Chapter 3 gives a general overview of the participation of amici institutions before peer 
international courts and tribunals. It seeks to show that amicus curiae interventions, 
especially by NGOs, have become a standard feature in international adjudication. 
Although the present study is not comparative, it discusses the development of amicus 
activity in the African human rights system against the backdrop of the amicus 
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practices, patterns and trends prevailing within other international dispute settlement 
fora. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses the amicus regulatory frameworks of the African Commission, the 
African Court and the African Children’s Rights Committee. It identifies gaps in the 
regulatory regimes of these bodies and makes proposals on how these weaknesses 
may be remedied to make amicus participation before them effective. In particular, it 
notes that the procedural frameworks for amicus participation in the African human 
rights system are underspecified and not comprehensive, and therefore inadequate 
for the effective management of amicus briefs.  
 
Chapter 5 deals with the informational role of the amici curiae before the aforesaid 
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. It appraises and assesses the role and significance 
of amicus participation in buttressing viewpoints as well as providing additional 
perspectives to enrich judicial analysis before these bodies. In the main, it argues that 
amicus curiae participation has the potential to enhance the reasoning and epistemic 
quality of the jurisprudence of these bodies as well as to influence the development of 
a pan-African legal policy in the region. 
 
Chapter 6 reflects on the legitimatory potential of amici curiae in the African human 
rights system.  It argues that the amicus procedure is an important opportunity, indeed, 
the only opportunity in international litigation that can be used by non-parties to 
channel a diversity of voices into a judicial forum in order to shape the discourse on 
critical legal and political policy and decision-making. In this way, this form of 
stakeholder participation furthers the democratic values of participation and 
deliberation. Thus, it has the potential to overcome the democratic deficit that haunts 
the international judiciary on account of its counter-majoritarian nature. The chapter 
argues that amicus participation is a badge of social legitimacy. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the study by tying together themes and findings arising from the 
preceding chapters and also sets out recommendations on how amicus participation 
can be made effective before the enforcement bodies of the African human rights 
system.  
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1.7 Limitations of the study 
 
The African human rights system is still in its nascent stage. The enforcement 
mechanisms of the African human rights system have decided very few cases, making 
it difficult to draw very firm conclusions at this stage on the emerging patterns, trends 
and general direction of their practice, insofar as amicus interventions are concerned. 
This inevitably limits the researcher to drawing only tentative or preliminary 
conclusions in the study. Indeed, work on the emerging phenomenon of amicus curiae 
in international litigation in general and the African human rights system in particular 
is just beginning.  
 
By clarifying the issues at play, this study seeks to lay the groundwork for further 
research. It must also be noted that for some writers, the African human rights system 
nomenclature includes the African sub-regional judicial institutions: the East African 
Court of Justice (EACJ); the Economic Community of West African States Court 
(ECOWAS Court); and the Southern African Development Community Tribunal 
(SADC Tribunal). This is despite the fact that these bodies are not human rights 
dedicated courts and are acting outside their primary area of competence when 
hearing human rights cases.  
 
In fact, the human rights functions of these sub-regional courts has been recognised 
by the African Court, to the extent that these sub-regional bodies were invited to 
participate in a colloquium for Africa’s human rights treaty organs operating in the field 
of human rights.64 This seemingly insignificant event, when taken together with the 
fact that the dockets of these bodies are dominated by human rights claims, depicts a 
picture of an expanded African regional human rights system, with sub-regional 
building blocks.65 African sub-regional tribunals are thus not to be dealt with in clinical 
isolation from the rest of the tribunals in the African human rights system.  
 
Despite the fact that these bodies have in recent years dealt with cases that are of 
great significance to the human rights discourse – and have in some cases accepted 
                                                          
64 The Colloquium of the African Human Rights Court and Similar Institutions, Arusha, Tanzania, 4 and 
6 October 2010. 
65 S Ebobrah ‘Human rights developments in African sub-regional economic communities during 2010’ 
(2011) 11/1 African Human Rights Law Journal 217. 
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amicus briefs, they are not discussed in this study. They were deliberately omitted on 
account of the need to enhance the depth of the present study and also because 
primary materials relating to these bodies are not easily accessible. These judicial 
bodies present fertile avenues for fruitful future research on amicus participation, 
building on the present study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE BILATERAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 
2.1 Introduction  
 
International courts and tribunals partake in a bilateral model of litigation. This is 
because these bodies possess an express legal competence usually founded on a 
consensual act of delegation from states.1 This chapter offers a critique of this 
bilateralist structure of international litigation and argues that it must be historicised 
and reconsidered as it fails to fully accommodate public interest, represented by amici 
curiae. Where a decision has deep-seated impact on general public interest, ‘it would 
be outrageous for [a] tribunal to bluntly ignore any offer of assistance made by third 
parties claiming to voice the interest of the public.’2 As seen in Chapter 1, the notion 
of public interest denotes a repository of interests that transcend individualistic 
concerns of parties to a dispute and therefore are not — or, at least, not fully — 
comprehensible in the context of the conventional bilateralist paradigm of international 
law.3 
 
According to Wiik, ‘the admission of an entity unrelated to the case before an 
international court or tribunal is anathema to the bilateral notion of international dispute 
settlement.’4 Although the amicus device has become a key fixture of international 
litigation,5 there have not been any serious academic efforts to square the international 
courts’ reliance on amicus curiae briefs with their hardwired commitment to the 
adversarial justice system. Given the multipolarity of the modern international legal 
order, bilateral approaches impose an artificial constraint upon the perception of the 
dispute, and constitute an impediment to the development of conflict management 
structures that are adequately responsive to the expanding number and quality of 
concerns in dispute.6  
                                                          
1 KJ Alter etal ‘How context shapes the authority of international courts’ iCourts Working Paper Series, 
no 18 (2016) 8. See also T Stephens International courts and environmental protection (2009) 94. 
2 A Mourre ‘Are amici curiae the proper response to the public’s concerns on transparency in investment 
arbitration’ (2006) 5/2 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 266. 
3 B Simma ‘From bilateralism to community interest in international law’ (1994) 248. 
4 A Wiik Amicus curiae participation before international courts and tribunals (2018) 177 – 178. 
5 See chapter 3 below. 
6 L Kirchhoff Constructive interventions: paradigms, process and practice of international mediation 
(2008) 76. 
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It therefore seems inevitable that the bilateral paradigm of litigation should be 
significantly re-modelled to reflect contemporary conditions because ‘bilateralism is no 
longer appropriate as the paradigm model for the regulation of activities on the 
international arena.’7 Rather, both the multipolarity of disputes as well as the existence 
of third parties must be acknowledged as salient features of modern international 
dispute settlement law. As Chinkin argues:  
The changes in the subject matter of international law, in the participants in international 
activities, and in the arenas within which participants perform have exposed the inadequacies 
of the bilateral model for the accommodation of third parties, either as individual members of 
the international community, or collectively as the international community as a whole.8  
In fact, nothing could be more incompatible with the very existence of public interest 
than the bilateralist conception of international law and the emphasis on the consent 
of states as the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by a tribunal.9 The increasing 
awareness of the existence of common interests in the international community, 
comprising not only of states but also of human beings, has impacted on the structure 
and processes of international law in profound ways.10 In this regard, Judge Trindade 
has expressed the opinion that ‘the growing consciousness of the need to bear in mind 
common values in pursuance of common interests has brought about a fundamental 
change in the outlook of international law in the last decade.’11  
The internationalisation of the amicus curiae from the domestic legal order as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, signifies the growing importance of public interest or the 
common concern doctrine in international law. Despite this development, the role and 
significance of amicus curiae is yet to be theorised in the context of the bilateralist 
structure of international judicial dispute settlement.12 The existing literature on the 
role and significance of third party intervenors in international litigation, scarcely deals 
with the reformulation of the unremittingly and perversely adversarial international 
                                                          
7 C Chinkin Third parties in international law (1993) 3. 
8 Ibid. 
9 AAC Trindade International law for humankind: towards a new jus gentium (2013) 314. 
10 Simma (n 3 above) 234. See also Y Tanaka ‘Protection of community interests in international law: 
the case of the law of the sea’ (2001) 15 Max Planck United Nations Yearbook 1331. 
11 AAC Trindade ‘International law for humankind: towards a new Jus Gentium’ (2005) 316.  
12 A Dolidze ‘Making international property law: the role of amici curiae in international judicial decision-
making’ (2013) 40 Syracuse Journal of International and Comparative Law 122. 
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litigation process which ignores the multipolarity of the international community, and 
the common goods that this community accommodates. 
2.2 From a bipolar to a multipolar world order 
 
To place the discussion into a proper perspective, it is important to give a historical 
background of the outlook of the international legal order in contrast to the present 
legal order. As shall be illustrated in passages that follow below, classical positivist 
international law was meant to govern the coexistence of states. It sought to delineate 
the respective territories within which each of the states into which the world is divided 
for political reasons is entitled to exercise its authority. In such a context, the bilateral 
model of dispute settlement proved adequate. The modern world is a multipolar 
compact comprising of states and non-state actors. Can the bilateralist framework of 
litigation still suffice? 
 
2.2.1 The essence of bilateralism 
 
Traditional international law had the typical function of regulating relations between 
states, in a framework of a horizontal and egalitarian structure of the international legal 
order.13 It is essentially ‘bilateral-minded.’14 Allot captures the essence of this system 
of law by describing it as ‘the minimal law necessary to enable state-societies to act 
as closed systems internally and to act as territory-owners in relation to each other.’15 
He states that the classic paradigm of international law is conceptualised in bilateralist 
terms and ‘establishes a bipartite relation of multiple rights and obligations that 
altogether constitute a minimal law and are in a reciprocal character.’16  
Similarly, Aust notes that traditionally, international law has been largely based on the 
private, contractual law and bilateralism model, since its primary concern was to 
govern the individual and ‘egoistic’ concerns of states.17 The concept of state 
responsibility was characterised by a distinct orientation aimed at reciprocity and 
                                                          
13 RP Mazzeschi ‘Human Rights and the modernization of International Law’ in F Lenzerini & AF 
Vrdoljak (eds) International law for common goods: normative perspectives on human rights, culture 
and nature (2014) 90. 
14 W Riphagen ‘Third Report on State Responsibility’ (1982) 2/1 Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 36 & 38. 
15 P Allot Eunomia, new order of a new world (1994) 234. 
16 Ibid. 229.  
17 HP Aust Complicity and the law of state responsibility (2011) 13. 
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bilateralism.18  Within this legal scheme, one state is the holder of a right and the other 
the holder of a duty, establishing a suite of rights and obligations among themselves 
akin to those established under the law of contract.19 In other words, traditional 
international law is conceptualised on the understanding that ‘one state owes a duty 
to another, the right-holding state.’20 
Underlying such a bilateralist approach appears to be a theoretical conception of the 
structure of international law in terms of which the law is defined by the correlative 
rights and obligations of its subjects.21 It is believed that this approach gives an orderly 
and methodical external ‘appearance of the law because it facilitates a precise 
identification of who has a right or a claim against whom and who may enforce it.’22 
Thus, the application of classical international law was limited to sovereign states, 
premised on their bilateral legal relations, on the fundamentally and inherently bilateral 
character of legal accountability; in essence, again to use the words of Allot, 
predicated on a ‘delict-property-contract ethos.’23  
This bilateralism is embedded in state consent, a strong perception of state 
sovereignty and the prohibition of interference in the internal affairs of another state. 
The bilateralist logic has been transposed to international courts and tribunals. For 
instance, the litigation process of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been 
described as ‘enervating bilateralism,’24 and further as reflecting ‘an old, tired view of 
international law.’25 Modern international law remains: 
An international system which was, and is, post-feudal society set in amber. Undemocratized. 
Unsocialized. Capable only of generating so-called international relations, in which so-called 
states act in the name of so-called national interests, through the exercise of so-called power, 
carrying out so-called foreign policy conducted by means of diplomacy, punctuated by medieval 
                                                          
18 Ibid. 
19 EK Proukaki Counter-measures, the non-injured state and the idea of international community 
(2010)12. 
20 C Warbrick ‘Book review: third parties in international law by Christine Chinkin’ (1994) 43/2 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 468. 
21 B Simma ‘International crimes: injury and countermeasures’ in A Weiler et al (eds) International 
crimes of state: a critical analysis of the ILC’s draft article 19 on state responsibility 283. 
22 Simma (n 3 above) 284. 
23 Allot (n 15 above) 335. 
24 The North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Germany v Denmark) [1969] ICJ Reports 3; Opinion of Judge 
Jennings para 32. 
25 Accordance with international law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo 
(Advisory Opinion) (2010) ICJ Report 403. Declaration of Judge Simma, para 2. 
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entertainments called wars or, in the miserable modern euphemism, armed conflict. This is the 
essence of the social process of the international non-society.26 
Frozen in its bilateral frames, and without adapting to modern social realities, 
international law may be condemned to remain what it has always been –residual, 
marginal and intermittent.27 Such an inflexible ‘every man for himself’ approach as 
Weil describes bilateralism,28 constitutes a severe barrier obstructing the way to the 
establishment of a cosmopolitan conceptualisation of a global human rights culture, 
which is nurtured by all members of the international community, including individuals 
and NGOs. The limitations associated with the bilateral system have led to questions 
being asked about how issues that are of concern to mankind, such as human rights 
principles, which may not be brought before the courts on account of lack of formal 
standing, can be enforced.  
2.2.2 The rise of community interests in the international legal system 
 
The antithesis of the bilateral system discussed above consists of the introduction of  
community interests in the creation and development of international rules and 
principles in a different track, as it were.29 Cursorily, community interests could be 
seen as a consensus in terms of which respect for certain basic values is not to be left 
to the free discretion of states, acting alone or in concert, but must be recognised and 
sanctioned by the international legal order as a matter of concern to all states, and the 
individuals comprising them.30 As Mosler notes: 
International Law cannot be defined solely in terms of bilateral or multilateral relations between 
subjects which possess legal capacity. The collection of subjects participating in the 
international legal order constitutes a community living according to common rules of conduct.31  
Indeed, the international legal system is at last overcoming functional deficits of the 
bilateral legal system and growing into what Simma calls ‘a much more socially 
                                                          
26 P Allott International law and international revolution: reconceiving the world (1989) 10. 
27 Allott (n 15 above) 104; See F Lenzerini ‘Introduction’ in F Lenzerini & AF Vrdoljak (eds) International 
law for common goods: normative perspectives on human rights, culture and nature (2014) 2. 
28 P Weil ‘Towards relative normativity in international law’ (1983) 77/3 American Journal of International 
Law 431. 
29 Simma (n 3 above) 233. 
30 Ibid. 
31 H Mosler International legal community (1995) 2 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1252. 
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conscious legal order.’32 Departing from the decision in the Lotus case,33 in terms of 
which states have a wide latitude of action as long as it does not fall foul a rule of 
international law, Judge Bedjaoui strenuously remarked that:  
It scarcely needs be said that the face of contemporary international society is markedly altered. 
… Witness the proliferation of international organisations, the gradual substitution of an 
international law of cooperation for traditional international law of co-existence, the emergence 
of the concept of “international community” … the resolutely positivist, voluntarist  approach of 
international law still currently  at the beginning of the [twentieth] century … has been replaced 
by an objective conception of international law, a law more readily seeking to reflect  a collective 
juridical conscience and respond to the social necessities of states organised as a 
community.34 
The argument being sustained is that, the ‘civilist’ bilateralist scheme of International 
Law is proving inadequate to accommodate certain collective principles, as a result of 
the broadening of the circle of affected or interested actors in the international legal 
scene.35 This is because international law has unquestionably entered a phase in 
which it cannot conceivably exhaust itself in the correlative rights and duties of its 
subjects, but also needs to incorporate the collective aspirations of mankind.36 This 
thinking draws from the fact that this system of law is not a mere corpus of legal 
doctrine destined to regulate relations between states inter se, but rather that, it 
constitutes a ‘comprehensive blueprint for social life.’37 As already seen, this approach 
and the public sentiment it reflects bodes ill for the bilateralist structure of the 
international legal order. Writing about this intrinsic tension, Simma notes that: 
... the observer is frequently torn between feelings of satisfaction because international law is 
finally being invested with some of the social accountability long developed in domestic law, 
and fears that the still primitive, still essentially bilateralist infrastructure upon which the new, 
more progressive edifices rest will turn out to be too weak to come to terms with the implications 
of such community interest.38 
 
                                                          
32 Simma (n 3 above) 233. 
33 Lotus case (France v Turkey) PCIJ 4, Judgment of 7 September 1927. 
34 Declaration of Judge Bedjaoui, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ICJ Reports 1996, 
270, para13. 
35 B Simma ‘Universality of international law from the perspective of a practitioner’ (2009) 20/2 European 
Journal of International Law 268. 
36 Simma (n 3 above) 250.  
37 C Tomuschat International law: ensuring the survival of mankind on the eve of a new century: general 
course on public international law (1999) 63. 
38 B Simma (n 3 above) 249. 
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Simma notes that finally, community sentiment can be seen percolating the scheme 
of international law but wonders if it will be fully accommodated within the bilateral 
strictures of international law. Indeed, one must be cautiously optimistic because 
international jurisdiction is still positivist voluntarist in character, founded on state 
consent. Thus, the litigation model of international courts and tribunals is adversarial 
in character, and typically unsuited for public interest cases. Therefore, those arguing 
against the formalism of classic international law and the discontents of its litigation 
may look beyond state consent but cannot ignore it. However, it is clear that there is 
a growing acknowledgement of the interests of mankind in the international 
community. This development has begun to break the mould of bilateralism that has 
been embedded in the international legal system for centuries.  
 
In particular, the human rights project has made international law to move inexorably 
towards a destination far beyond the contours of bilateralism. This is because the 
global or regional protection of human rights is an ideal that cannot realistically be 
pursued and achieved through the classic bilateralist legal imagination given the broad 
impact and publicness of this branch of the law. Thus, international human rights law 
is turning the state entity inside-out in virtually the most literal sense.39 The ‘genie of 
human rights has escaped from the bottle’: human rights principles pervade virtually 
all spheres of international law.40 It has become something akin to a ‘worldwide secular 
religion’.41 Although human rights provides a private benefit to the individual, it also 
provides public benefits to the international community – at least that is the theoretical 
logic behind the international human rights law project.42  
2.3 The classical bilateral litigation model and its discontents 
 
Because there is inadequate literature on the bilateral nature of international litigation, 
the present study will in some cases draw inspiration from the literature on the 
domestic adversarial model of litigation to develop its theoretical argument and offer 
                                                          
39 Ibid. 233. 
40 B Simma ‘The ICJ and common goods: the case of human rights’ in F Lenzerini & AF Vrdoljak (eds) 
International law for common goods: normative perspectives on human rights, culture and nature (2014) 
35. 
41 E Wiesel ‘A tribute to human rights’ in E Stamatopoulou et al (eds) The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: Fifty years and beyond (1999) 3. 
42 D Bodansky ‘What’s in a concept? global public goods, international law, and legitimacy’ (2012) 23/3 
European Journal of International Law 653. 
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illustrations. As already pointed out, litigation before international courts and tribunals 
is in principle predominantly adversarial or bilateral. This minimalist or monofunctional 
viewpoint of the international judiciary stems from the understanding that international 
courts and tribunals are instruments in the hands of the disputing parties for the 
resolution of concrete or discrete cases in a state centric world legal order.43 
 
In terms of this understanding, international courts and tribunals decide disputes in the 
name of the states that created them, and these mechanisms are expected to maintain 
a scrupulous fidelity to this function.44 Because it is the parties to the suit that control 
international litigation, it is non-participatory and not public interest-driven. In a purely 
bilateralist framework, the petitioner accuses the respondent state of violating his or 
her rights, which are guaranteed by one or more of the treaties that the state has 
signed and ratified to signify consent to be bound. The parties alone define the subject-
matter of the dispute and they generally enjoy a monopoly of the fact-finding process 
with the court acting as a passive umpire.45  
 
Decisions as to whether or not to initiate proceedings at all; how to plead the case 
(that is, what claims and defences to raise and which reliefs to seek); which evidence 
to lead and which legal submissions to advance are entirely left to the discretion of the 
parties.46 In essence, the parties enjoy ‘ownership’ of the case. The court or tribunal 
bases its decision on the case as pleaded and argued by the record parties. The role 
of the court or tribunal in a bilateral setting is limited to establishing facts in dichotomic 
terms i.e it determines the dispute on the basis of an opposing normative set of 
viewpoints presented by the parties to the case.   
 
Because litigation in an adversarial setting is mostly restricted to the parties to the 
dispute, it does not create an opportunity for participation by third or other international 
                                                          
43 A von Bogdandy & I Venzke ‘On the functions of international courts: an appraisal in light of their 
burgeoning public authority’ (2013) 26/1 Leiden Journal of International Law 59. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. Writing about his experiences at the bench Frankel observed that ‘many judges, withdrawn from 
the fray, watch it with benign and detached affection, chuckling nostalgically now and then as the truth 
suffers injury or death in the process.’ ME Frankel ‘The search for truth: an umpireal view’ (1975) 123/5 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1034. 
46 JIH Jacob The fabric of the English civil justice (1987) 8. See also M Keyes Jurisdiction in international 
litigation (2005) 18. 
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actors.47 In other words, the bilateralist litigation model leaves no room for interests 
transcending those of the parties to the dispute. In the words of Wolfrum, the 
‘bilateralization of a legal dispute which, as a consequence, limits the possibility to 
intervene is appropriate for truly bilateral relations but one has to acknowledge that 
international disputes rarely fit into a purely bilateral pattern.’48 This model of litigation 
perfunctorily and erroneously assumes that the named parties’ self-interest will ensure 
that all relevant material facts, evidence and legal submissions are presented and 
evaluated before the court.  
 
An intervention by a third party is perceived as disruptive and ‘an interference which 
may complicate the … settlement of the dispute.’49 The philosophy of international 
litigation is that principal parties shall be left alone to litigate a case free from 
interference by strangers. This system obscures the critical fact that public law 
litigation or adjudication involves not only a private purpose of inter-partes dispute 
settlement that achieves ‘private justice’ but also a quintessentially public purpose. 
The further that decisions of international courts and tribunals depart from the inter 
partes rule, the more pressing the need for all potentially affected individuals to have 
a meaningful and effective opportunity to influence the outcome of those cases.50 
 
As Shelton points out, ‘[r]arely is international litigation a matter of private concern or 
interest affecting only the parties. Even where narrow issues are presented, there may 
be broad human rights impacts.’51 The exclusion of, or the limited access granted to 
amici curiae is another illustration of how international adjudicatory bodies are seen 
as instruments in the hands of the principal parties for resolving disputes in concrete 
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51 D Shelton The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings, 
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cases.52 If the inter partes rule were to be slavishly applied or followed, international 
adjudication would be extremely individualistic and inefficient.53 
 
In addition, the participation of an amicus curiae in a case is also sometimes seen as 
creating an unjust situation of ‘two against one’ and therefore arouses a sense of fear 
that such an intervention may skew the adversarial process. This is because for some, 
the question of amicus intervention is not procedural at all but rather substantive and 
bears the power to unfairly tilt the balance of arms between the parties, creating an 
unacceptable disequilibrium and also undermining party autonomy.54 The writers 
subscribing to this thinking believe that amicus interventions dislocate the basic 
structure of international litigation and pervert its purposes. It is sometimes said that 
equality of arms, as in the sense of a ‘fair balance,’ is linked to considerations that 
legal proceedings must, of necessity, be adversarial.55  
 
For others, to admit an amicus intervenor in bilateral litigation might even appear to 
upset or unsettle the basic individualistic structure and thus compromise the integrity 
of the proceeding.56 Critics also point out that in some cases, the motive of epistemic 
communities to influence case outcomes is not altruistic but that there is one set of 
values or constitutive claims that they are pursuing which is inconsistent with the goals 
of other participants in the dispute resolution process.57 Discussing the adversarial 
model of litigation in domestic law, which bears virtually all the trappings of a bilateralist 
model of international law, Freedman writes that the basic assumption of the 
adversarial system of litigation is that the ‘most efficient and fair way of determining 
the truth is by presenting the strongest possible case for each side of the controversy 
before an impartial judge or jury.’58  
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Sandifer notes that the adversarial model of litigation is not concerned with the 
revelation of truth but rather to ensure that ‘evidence is brought before the court in 
accordance with the established rules and to render a verdict in favour of the party 
who succeeded in presenting the most convincing evidence through the rules.’59 The 
views expressed by these writers underscore the point that the bilateralist model of 
litigation imposes an unwanted constraint on the accommodation of common interests 
by the courts and constitutes an impediment to the development of international law 
which is responsive to the ever-expanding demands and concerns of the international 
society.60  
 
Similarly, Fowkes writes that bilateralism is ‘inappropriate in public interest contexts,’ 
and it is ‘the formal shackles from which litigation seeking substantive justice must 
break free.’61 This bipolar model of litigation short-sightedly fixates the sight of the 
courts on the immediate material-political effects of their decisions while at the same 
time ignoring the long-term doctrinal effects of these decisions, which in turn impact 
on the development of international law. According to Chinkin, there exists an 
immanent conflict or tension in the position of intervenors in international curial 
processes which stems from the structure of the international legal order itself.62 She 
further points out that: 
 
The bilateral formulation by parties of cases for presentation before adjudicative tribunals 
frequently does not take into account the multifaceted interests characteristically at stake in 
international disputes. International situations that culminate in claims are rarely bilateral, 
although it may be in the parties' interests to present them as such. More frequently the actions 
and reactions of States in their international dealings will impinge on the interests of other 
participants … Yet when the decision is made to resort to adjudication or arbitration these third-
party interests are minimized, and the dispute is presented before the tribunal as bilateral.63 
International litigation in general and international human rights litigation in particular 
is a multi-sided enterprise which turns on its head the ancient maxim that to every 
                                                          
59 D Sandifer Evidence before international tribunals (1975) 1. 
60 Chinkin (n 7 above) 2.  
61 J Fowkes ‘Civil procedure in public interest litigation: tradition, collaboration and the managerial judge’ 
(2012) 1/3 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 235. 
62 Chinkin (n 7 above) 147. 
63 Chinkin (n 7 above) 148. See also J Hermida ‘A new model of application of international law in 
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case there are two sides. In a seminal article that considers legal adversarialism in a 
postmodern, multicultural and post-structural world, Menkel-Meadow strenuously 
argues that: ‘[m]odern life presents us with complex legal problems, often requiring 
complex and multifaceted solutions.’64 She correctly adds that the adversarial model 
of litigation is therefore scarcely adequate to resolve these multi-dimensional 
dilemmas.65  
 
To build her argument, she notes, among other things, that litigators invariably seek 
to secure their clients’ interests and ‘win’ the case, which may in reality entail simply 
‘obfuscating’ the opponent’s case, or leaving out critical facts if they are considered 
harmful or inconvenient.66 In litigation, lawyers engage in what is called the fight 
theory, which derives from the origin of trials as substitutes for out-of-court private 
duels or brawls.67 This theory posits that the principal aim of litigation is to organise 
facts in a manner suitable to the client’s case.68 Parties strive as hard as possible, in 
an intensely partisan spirit to bring before the court evidence favourable to their side 
of the case, ignoring what they consider inconvenient and thereby distorting the truth. 
 
To be direct, the adversarial model lacks a singularly important quality, namely, the 
genuine ability to search for truth. That means that it cannot comprehensively address 
the full panoply of issues implicated in most human rights disputes. As Frankel notes, 
the adversarial process often attains truth ‘only as a convenience, a by-product, or an 
accidental approximation.’69 But, as Lord Denning of the British House of Lords 
reminds us, the court’s objective ‘above all, is to find out the truth, and to do justice 
according to law.’70 In a similar language, Justice Stewart of the US Supreme Court 
has remarked that ‘the basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth.’71  
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65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 J Frank Courts on trial (1950) 80 – 102. 
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Although the above judicial pronouncements were made in the context of domestic 
law, they apply with equal measure to international litigation. Because truth is relative, 
interpretable, and cannot be established apodictically, it is necessary that the litigation 
process must be participatory so that all actors involved can use their expertise to 
throw some light on the dispute. The premise for this approach is that human rights 
audiences are characterised by a multiplicity of knowledge systems, all of which may 
have different perceptions about a particular human rights concern. Indeed, the globe 
is home to different cosmologies characterised by various knowledge systems, and, 
each of these may have different concepts of knowledge and truth and, in most times, 
these are indeed constitutive of dissimilar world realities. Given this relativity of truth, 
there will always be divergent (and partisan) views among various schools of thought, 
and thus clashes of ideas.  
 
Competing ideas must be allowed free reign, each to establish itself as the truth; to be 
tested against counteracting material realities and therefore to enrich judicial analysis. 
No single answer is the right one; principles, legitimate difference and pluralism are at 
play. As a social interlocutor, the amicus curiae is thus best suited to offer assistance 
to a court or tribunal to search for truth and deliver a decision that is more likely to be 
informed by, and reflexive of a panoply of societal interests.72 This device is part and 
parcel of a rich and broad-based ideational societal conversation. Certainly, a bipolar 
method entailing the oppositional representation of facts in a case does not present 
the best way for the court to search for the truth. In fact, a binary debate distorts the 
truth as illustrated earlier.73 
 
In some cases, these distortions occur as a result of the exaggerated representation 
of opposing stories which tend to make the assessment of facts which fall somewhere 
in between or outside the scope of the submissions of the parties difficult to make.74 
Consequently, it is unduly self-limiting for a court of law to draw its knowledge about 
the dispute, the material facts, its political and socio-economic context, its possible 
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consequences, the implications of alternative decisions, and the relevant or applicable 
law solely from the materials submitted by parties to the dispute.  
 
There is an intrinsic contradiction between truth-seeking on the one hand and the 
exclusion of other potential sources of relevant truth beside the parties on the other. 
The amicus brief is therefore vital in assisting the court to search for truth and 
approximate the public interest. With the benefit of input from amici curiae, litigation 
that would ordinarily end with a limited outcome sought by one party against the other 
is replaced by a more interactive and comprehensive process that seeks to produce a 
publicly desirable outcome. In the pursuit for truth, the amicus brief is strikingly similar 
or contiguous to the fact-finding methods of inquisitorial civil law systems in which a 
court may independently gather data or facts (often through experts) without relying 
on the disputing parties before it.75 It is therefore contended that the amicus device 
has the potential to close the gap between a bilateral dispute resolution approach and 
public interest consequences. 
Moreover, some human rights dilemmas may be too complex to be satisfactorily dealt 
with in a binary scheme of a court case. For the most part, a human rights case can 
present multiple and complex legal questions which require a comprehensive 
methodology to resolve, as opposed to the mutually exclusive accounts of the parties. 
As already argued, essential issues in a case, as well as relevant evidence and legal 
submissions, should not emanate solely from the duelling parties, nor exclusively from 
the public alone, but from their combination. This is the approach that should preside 
in and permeate the adjudication process of international human rights law. The 
argument being sustained is that the briefs by the primary parties to the suit 
circumscribe the truth: they should not be viewed as absolute frontiers of truth.76 The 
natural limits of bilateralism tend to stem the supply of information from outside 
sources to the tribunal.77 This bilateralism also finds expression in the traditional 
conception of a legal dispute in international law. 
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2.4 Reformulating the classical concept of a legal dispute 
 
According to the classical positivist conceptualisation, a legal dispute is a 
disagreement between two parties (usually states) to a suit on a point of fact or law or 
a conflict of legal viewpoints or interests.78 The basic assumption underlying 
international litigation is therefore that there are two opposing parties to a contentious 
case, and such an adversarial process is res inter alios acta in relation to third 
parties.79 In the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case,80 the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) defined a legal dispute as ‘a disagreement on a point of 
law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons.’81 Similarly, 
in the Interpretations case,82 the ICJ spoke of a dispute as ‘a situation in which the two 
sides [hold] clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-
performance of certain treaty obligations.’83  
 
It has been said that what the PCIJ and ICJ had in mind in formulating the above 
definitions is that it necessarily follows as a matter of course that a legal dispute must 
be characterised by a certain measure of communication demonstrating opposing 
demands and denials between two parties.84 Some international tribunals such as the 
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International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)85 and ICSID86 have also adopted 
the above triadic definition of a ‘legal dispute’ drawing on the jurisprudence of the 
International Court.  
 
Inspired by the doctrine of legal positivism, many writers in this area continue to 
analyse international litigation as a value-free dynamic between a triad: namely, the 
two adversary parties and the impartial adjudicator.87 The most noted proponent of 
this theory is Shapiro who notes that the logic of dispute resolution requires a triadic 
structure, i.e the two adversarial parties and the decision maker. The decision-maker 
is clothed with a measure of authority to hear the case because the parties have 
consented to such a function.88 Shapiro argues that a prototypical supranational 
litigation comprises, ‘(a) an independent judge applying (b) pre-existing legal norms 
(c) adversary proceedings in order to achieve (d) a dichotomous decision in which one 
of the parties was assigned the legal wrong and the other found wrong.’89  
 
Similarly, according to Paulus, classical or conventional dispute settlement entails the 
resolution of a dispute between two or more parties by an independent and impartial 
decision maker, ‘ideally a court or an arbitral tribunal, in an adversarial procedure on 
the basis of international law.’90 For his part, Hopmann writes that ‘international courts 
… are often introduced to arbitrate disputes. In this instance, the arbitrator listens to 
the arguments of the two sides and then renders a decision that is binding on the 
parties.’91 Likewise, in constructing a normative and prescriptive theory to explain the 
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effectiveness of international courts and tribunals, Helfer and Slaughter also make 
reference to the triadic relationship between the court and the disputing parties.92  
 
Drawing on Shapiro’s triadic formulation, Grossmann points out that a legitimate court 
process provides litigants with equal opportunities to put across their viewpoints both 
orally and in writing and to reply to the opposing party.93 Thereafter, an open-minded 
and impartial decision-maker will evaluate the arguments and render a decision that 
one or both litigants may be dissatisfied with, but remains authoritative nonetheless.94 
The concept of international adjudication as a triadic structure obscures and 
underrates the critical contribution that non-parties, such as amici curiae, can play in 
international judicial-decision-making. The limitations of the classical concept of law 
characterised by bilateralism and the rigid doctrine of state consent have been 
circumvented by the emphasis on the imperative that international law must be used 
as an instrument of change.95 At the forefront of these changes is international human 
rights law. 
 
2.5 International human rights litigation 
 
International human rights litigation is a relatively new phenomenon.96 Because of their 
fundamental role in enforcing public interest, regional human rights judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies are strongly influenced by ideas of public law and have markedly 
deviated from the bilateralist orientation of classical international litigation. As von 
Bogdandy and Venzke point out, ‘the traditional one-dimensional view of international 
judicial practice clearly breaks down if cast onto younger international institutions in 
the field of human rights...’97 This is because human rights courts and tribunals are 
giving opinions which, like those of domestic constitutional courts, do not merely 
resolve the disputes brought before them by the parties, but also stimulate and inform 
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ongoing legal, social and political dialogue on human rights issues. They become part 
and parcel of a rich and varied dialogue in society.98  
 
Deeply embedded in emerging international legal theory is the understanding that 
international human rights norms are an expression of universal values that must 
apply, regardless of national frontiers or the choice of political systems in different 
countries. These norms are said to have a binding effect on states without the need 
for their prior consent or regard for their domestic processes. Rubenfeld refers to this 
phenomenon as ‘international constitutionalism’, because the normative content of 
these rights is determined by international judges and other experts without regard to 
internal democratic politics.99 To be direct, and as discussed in detail in Chapter 6, 
decisions of international human rights courts and tribunals have erga omnes 
effects.100   
 
It has been said that ‘[t]he intention behind the erga omnes theory… is to sound the 
death knell of narrow bilateralism and sanctified egoism for the sake of the universal 
protection of fundamental norms relating, in particular, to human rights.’101 The ICJ 
has also emphasised that obligations arising from such norms include the enforcement 
of basic rights.102 As scholarship in this area shows, erga omnes norms are the 
concern for the entire mankind. Therefore, all states can be taken to have a legal 
interest in their protection.103 The consequence arising from this is that all actors in the 
international legal system would have standing to demand the enforcement of these 
obligations. Reflecting on the emergence of erga omnes norms in international law, 
Rosenne writes that it seems: 
That something needs to be done to bring international procedural law into line with that […] 
International judicial procedure, although it has developed remarkably especially since 1945, is 
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still cast in a XIXth century mould, and the strict bilateralism of international litigation is one of 
its hallmarks.104 
A general concern has been expressed that despite the growing dominance of 
international courts on the global stage, ‘no new theory accompanies them. We 
continue to think about international adjudication in view of ideas and proposals dating 
back to around the turn of the twentieth century.’105 It is submitted that the involvement 
of amicus curiae in international litigation may address the concerns raised by 
Rosenne to a large degree and alter the bilateral dynamic at play in international 
litigation. Indeed, Shelton argues that, ‘particularly where obligations erga omnes are 
at issue, a role for non-governmental amici would seem appropriate.’106 The erga 
omnes effect of judgments of supranational bodies is more pronounced in the context 
of the human rights system.107 The discussion will then turn to consider how the 
phenomenon of the erga omnes effect played out in the European, Inter-American and 
African human rights systems. 
 
2.5.1 The European system  
 
Dolidze notes that the European Court of Human Rights (the European Court) allowed 
the filing of amicus briefs when the effects of its interpretation and application of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (European Convention)108 were being felt 
beyond the parties to a particular case.109 Commentators have thus noted that the 
European Court is increasingly assuming a role akin to that of a constitutional court.110 
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This quasi-constitutionalist orientation is cemented by the constitutional status that the 
Convention enjoys in various European countries. For instance, in Austria this 
instrument has equal status with that country’s Constitution. In the Netherlands, the 
Convention ranks higher than the Constitution.111 
 
It has been said that the European Court serves not only to deliver justice between the 
parties to the suit but also serves the public order of the European Community (EC).112 
In Loizidou v Turkey,113 the European Court eschewed a mechanical and restrictive 
approach to dispute resolution that might not only ‘seriously weaken’ its role in the 
discharge of its functions but ‘would also diminish the effectiveness of the Convention 
as a constitutional instrument of European public order (ordre public).’114 It has been 
stated in relation to the European Court that ‘[t]he core issue is not to settle a bilateral 
dispute, but to protect individual rights.’115  
 
In Tyrer v UK,116 a request by the petitioner to withdraw an application was refused by 
the Commission (a decision endorsed by the Court) on the basis that the case ‘raised 
questions of a general character affecting the observance of the Convention which 
necessitated a further examination of the issues involved’117 In Marcks v Belgium,118 
the Court specifically recognised that its judgments have erga omnes effects, i.e ‘the 
effects extending beyond the confines of this particular case’ within the general legal 
order of the respondent state.119 In much clearer terms, the European Court stated in 
Ireland v the UK120 that: 
 
The Court’s judgments in fact serve not only to decide those cases brought before the Court 
but, more generally to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, 
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thereby contributing to the observance, by the states, of the engagements undertaken by them 
as Contracting Parties.121  
Similarly, in Opuz v Turkey122 the Court ruled that in its assessment of compliance with 
the Convention, it will look into the question of ‘whether the national authorities have 
sufficiently taken into account the principles flowing from its judgments on similar 
issues, even when they concern other states.’123 In Karner v Austria124 it was noted 
that although the raison d'être of the European Court is to provide individual redress, 
its aim is also to decide cases on public-policy considerations, ‘thereby raising the 
general standards of protection of human rights and extending human rights 
jurisprudence throughout the community of Convention States.’125  
 
In addition, a 2010 report by the Council of Europe lists countries that have amended 
their statutes following judgments by the European Court condemning similar laws 
enacted by other states.126 Summarising the erga omnes nature of the decisions of 
the European Court, Brems and Lavrysen relevantly and helpfully state that: 
 
The Court should have an eye for stakeholders who may not be among the formal parties in 
the case: the arguments advanced by the [defendant state] may be representative of a (smaller 
or larger) part of its population while third parties (other states or nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs)) may also represent widely shared views or interests. Since the judgment 
will have authority beyond the parties and outside the state concerned, citizens all over Europe 
(and beyond) may expect to see their concerns taken seriously in the Court’s judgments.127 
There is general consensus emerging from the Strasbourg jurisprudence that ‘the 
maintenance and further realisation of fundamental freedoms’ in Europe and the 
‘achievement of greater unity between its members’ requires an expansive 
understanding of the Court’s mission and vision, not only as regards the conditions for 
the admission of petitions before the Court and the striking out of non-compliant 
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applications but also the effects of its decisions.128 As Hodson notes, the contemporary 
significance of the Court resides less in its function as an adjudicator in the ‘epic battle’ 
between the individual on the one hand and the nation-state on the other, but more in 
the democratic space that it provides to interest groups seeking to bring about legal 
and policy changes.129  
 
2.5.2 The Inter-American system 
 
As in the case of the European Court, decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (Inter-American Court) have effects that transcend the immediate interests of 
the direct parties to the dispute and are felt in the entire region. The Inter-American 
Court itself has stated that its interpretation of the Inter-American Convention on 
Human Rights (Inter-American Convention)130 is ‘guided by considerations of a 
superior general interest or ordre public which transcend the individual interests of [the 
parties].’131 In more concrete terms, the Inter-American Court noted in Almonacid v 
Chile,132 that: 
When a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, 
as part of the State, are also bound by such Convention. This forces them to see that all the 
effects of the provisions embodied in the Convention are not adversely affected by the 
enforcement of laws which are contrary to its purpose and that have not had any legal effects 
since their inception. In other words, the Judiciary must exercise a sort of 'conventionality 
control' between the domestic legal provisions which are applied to specific cases and the 
American Convention on Human Rights. To perform this task, the Judiciary has to take into 
account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter- American 
Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.133 [Italics supplied] 
 
In this passage, the Court brings to the attention of national judiciaries that in making 
reference to the Convention, its jurisprudence must be the touchstone in determining 
whether or not a law, policy or conduct of a contracting state is compliant with the 
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script of the Convention.134 After being applied first in the Almonacid case, this 
approach was affirmed in subsequent cases.135 High Courts in Colombia and Peru 
have struck down amnesty laws on the basis of judgments handed down by the Inter-
American Court, invalidating similar amnesty laws in Peru.136 
2.5.3 The African system 
 
The adjudicatory bodies of the African human rights system have not yet pronounced 
themselves on the erga omnes effect of their decisions. However, there is no doubt 
that their decisions have implications even for states which were not parties to the 
case before them. This is particularly true if the lessons from the European and Inter-
American systems are anything to go by. This inevitably constitutionalises politics 
throughout the AU region.  Writing in its early days, Oder expressed the firm belief that 
‘[t]he African Court's judgments will have a wider impact, beyond the country against 
whom an application has been brought.’137 The same view is shared by Oppong in 
relation to decisions of the African Commission, adding that domestic courts continue 
to rely on decisions of African regional bodies although ‘there is no formal state-treaty 
mandated relationship between these African national courts and the international 
courts from which they are borrowing’.138  
Similarly, Enabulele argues that a decision of the African Court on the incompatibility 
of domestic law, policy, practice or conduct with the African Charter stands on a 
relatively higher normative pedestal ‘and is set on a wider range of application than a 
decision that simply finds a violation of the right of an individual.’139 He correctly argues 
that such decisions carry implications for all the states over which the Court exercises 
jurisdiction, including those that are not signatories to the Court’s Protocol but are 
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nonetheless parties to the African Charter.140 This is because the function of the 
African Court is not merely to determine the conflicting claims of the parties but also 
the development and maintenance of public order like its peers in the European and 
Inter-American systems.  
Murray states that, like in the case of the European Court, the African judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies should exhibit the willingness to examine a case that raises 
important constitutional questions, even where the petitioner desires to withdraw it.141 
Indeed, judgments of African regional human rights judicial and quasi-judicial bodies 
have an advisory character. On every occasion that these bodies decide cases, they 
are not just spelling out the rights and obligations of the parties that happen to be 
involved in that case, but they also develop the law. Naturally, the immediate and 
strongest impact of the decision will be felt in the respondent state. However, all states 
in the AU region must stay abreast of developments.142  
If the African Court’s case docket should involve legal disputes capable of general 
application, then this may allow it to develop rules and principles that would have 
application beyond the confines of the African region.143 In this regard, the African 
Court has a wider potential contribution to make to human rights law, clarifying the 
substantive commitments incurred by states under regional treaties and general 
international law. For Mutua, the African Court must assert the erga omnes effect of 
its rulings and hear only those cases that have the potential to expound on the African 
Charter, and create jurisprudence that will guide African states in developing a legal 
and political culture in which respect for human rights is at the centre of the polity.144  
In the view of this author, this will help the African Court to avoid a docket crisis similar 
to the one that is presently facing the European Court. In this regard, his argument 
proceeds, the Court should not be concerned with individual claims seeking to correct 
or punish a past wrong to an individual.145 He reasons that the Court should be 
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forward-looking and develop a corpus of law with precedential value and an 
interpretation of the substantive provisions of the African Charter and kindred universal 
human rights texts to guide and direct African states.146  
According to Mutua, such forward-looking decisions would help to deter states from 
future conduct that is inimical to the African Charter by adjusting their behaviour.147 In 
terms of this author’s logic, individual justice would occur as a mere coincidence in the 
few cases that the Court would hear.148 There is no doubt that Mutua’s thinking is 
heavily influenced by scholarship on the European Court that suggests that the 
European Court should move away from individual justice towards constitutional 
justice, in which situation, it will deal with only a few cases involving structural and 
systemic violations of the Convention, thereby addressing its docket crises by reducing 
its caseload.149  
While this approach could work with the European Court, it appears ill-suited to the 
African environment. This is because as against African states, the overwhelming 
majority of European states have made huge strides in establishing vibrant oversight 
mechanisms for human rights protection and the consolidation of democracy in their 
territories. In contrast, many African states still have weak, manipulable and 
dysfunctional judiciaries that are unable to provide redress for victims of human rights 
abuses. As a consequence, the citizens of many African countries look to the 
adjudicative organs of the African system as bastions of hope to achieve justice. If the 
door of the African Court is shut in their faces, where else will they look?  
There is no doubt that a shift in jurisdiction by the African Court from individual justice 
to constitutional justice will plunge it into a legitimacy crisis of damaging proportions. 
The African Court’s role and legitimacy in stemming the tide of human rights violations 
on the African continent remains firmly anchored in its ability, in each individual 
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petition, to provide adequate redress for human rights abuses where national 
remedies have been found to be non-existent or ineffective. It is inarguable that in 
determining individual claims, the Court will inevitably be called upon to develop 
general principles of human rights law which define the jurisprudential canon of the 
African regional human rights law.  
In international law, ‘settling disputes is not just about settling disputes.’150 As Alvarez 
points out, institutionalised dispute mechanisms can be conceived as both conflict 
settlers as well as guardians of public values.151 The policy function of an international 
court is indissociable from and certainly should not trump the continued emphasis on 
the provision of redress to individual victims of human rights abuses.152 Individual 
petitions are a means by which gaps in the national human rights enforcement system 
are identified and by which the general normative standard in the respondent as well 
as the generality of member states is raised.153  
It is important to note that individual justice and constitutional justice are not mutually 
opposed. International human rights courts and tribunals perform a range of functions 
at the same time. Their individual and constitutional review processes are reconcilable 
and legitimate functions.154 In a nutshell, what is proposed by the present author is 
that the main focus of the African Court should be the delivery of individual justice, 
which is its raison d'être, while it keeps in mind its equally important function of 
formulating general jurisprudential canons underlying its decisions. In this way, the 
court strives at reconciling the truths of individual justice and collective justice. While 
expressing sympathy for Mutua’s logic, it is an idea whose time has not yet arrived in 
Africa.  
2.6 Squaring the admission of amicus briefs with bilateralism  
 
It is submitted that the admission of amici curiae in international human rights litigation 
has the potential to break the bilateral mould of classical international litigation, making 
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it broad-based and inclusive, rather than technocratic and legalistic. In other words, 
the amicus device shifts the litigation process out of its traditional bipolar pattern into 
something that has greater procedural flexibility. The functional deficit associated with 
the international bilateralist model of litigation could be mitigated to some extent if 
international human rights tribunals sought and/or accepted the assistance of amici 
curiae. The function of these entities is to broaden judicial inquiry. Despite the fact that 
the bilateralist litigation approach was adequate to resolve disputes in the global legal 
order, it is no longer adequate given the cosmopolitan character of modern 
international law in which judicial proceedings often have repercussions felt beyond 
the parties to the dispute. Wiik shares this view and writes that ‘[a]mici curiae can 
soothe the imperfections of the bilateral structure of dispute settlement’155 
 
Attempts by civil society to contribute ‘outside’ perspectives in the disposition of 
disputes are frustrated by the requirements of the bilateralist model of litigation which 
emphasises self-interest, and attaches enormous importance to individual initiative 
and the significance it places on the role of the disputing parties.156  This model of 
litigation is dogmatic and correspondingly pays little regard to the interests of non-
parties and the general public.157 The participation of amici curiae is an exception to 
the rule, and where an amicus intervenor is admitted, stringent conditions are imposed 
on the admission to preserve party autonomy. What is needed instead is the structural 
adjustment of international litigation to accommodate divergent normative viewpoints 
in which the amicus device is used as a heuristic, participatory and constructive tool.158  
If liberally afforded access, the amicus curiae can serve as an agent of ‘inclusive 
pluralism which recognises a diversity of views regarding the public interest and the 
impact of legal decisions on the public.’159 This is because the rights and interests that 
amici curiae normally seek to vindicate are relatively abstract, intangible, collective 
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and ideological or public in outlook.160 In addition, the amicus intervenor has some 
wiggle room in court to put across factual and legal perspectives which parties to the 
dispute do not enjoy the liberty to do. This is because lawyers as officers of the court, 
owe the court an ethical duty not to burden it with materials that do not bear directly 
on the disposal of the case and must also display maximum candour in their relations 
with the court at all times. On the other hand, an amicus is generally not limited as to 
the issues it can raise since it participates in the proceedings on the basis of public 
interest.161  
More than intervention in a quest to protect personal rights or interests, amicus 
participation betokens the radical transformation of international litigation from a 
bilateral process to a public one.162 It has been argued that the amicus device is vital 
‘in the gradual but perceptible evolution of international law from a system of multiple 
sets of inter partes arrangements to a comprehensive, multi-layered legal order.’163 It 
has been argued amicus submissions in the context of international litigation provide 
an opportunity to address questions of general policy rather to be rigidly confined to 
‘assessing the merits of the specific dispute,’ which is typically the province of the 
parties.164 
 
The intervention by groups as friends of the court marks an important shift away from 
the individual values that gained prominence in the nineteenth century towards an 
emphasis on the collective or diffuse interests of the community and the welfare of the 
public.165 The shift from bilateralism to multilateralism or communitarianism in litigation 
signifies that international courts and tribunals, as organs of the international 
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community, are charged principally with the duty to protect the community’s core 
values and interest.166 Indeed, it is admitted that the principal mandate of international 
courts is to settle disputes between parties, but they cannot do so without regard to 
public interest. It is with this understanding that Judge Pinto de Albuquerque remarked 
in Fabris v France,167 that ‘the … underlying general interest justified the introduction 
of the concept … of third-party intervention.’168 It is in this context that it has been 
suggested that ‘[t]he amicus device complements the voluntarist and bilateral origins 
of international law with public interest based normative structures.’169 
However, the international litigation model needs not to only take into account the 
bilateral relationships between states but also to pay attention to the values and 
interests of the international community as a whole.170 This becomes more relevant to 
the African human rights system because the African Charter protects ‘peoples’s 
rights’, a concept that is closely associated with collective rights.171 This instrument 
shifts the traditional paradigm of human rights theory from individualism to 
communitarianism through an extensive affirmation of peoples’ rights.  
According to Ouguergouz, ‘through its emphatic enshrinement of the rights of peoples, 
the African Charter can be seen as a revolutionary legal instrument.’172 Indeed, the 
African Commission repeated these sentiments in Centre for Minority Rights 
Development & Anor v Kenya (the Endorois case),173 when it said that ‘the African 
Charter is an innovative and unique human rights document compared to other 
regional human rights instruments, in placing special emphasis on the rights of 
peoples.’174 The shift from bilateralism to an inclusive litigation system reflects that the 
circle of international law is widening to include individuals and NGOs in addition to 
states. 
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Abi-Saab states that ‘[t]he question of amicus curiae relates to the multiplication and 
greater activism of new international actors and how they can find their way into the 
international legal system.’175 Consequently, international legal processes must take 
into consideration the interests of these additional members of the international legal 
family. It is in this context that Kooijmans has remarked that: 
Gone are the days when international litigation was invariably either inter-State dispute 
settlement or commercial arbitration with a sparse mixture of the two in [the] case of State 
contracts. The post-World War II mechanisms give access to a great variety of non-state actors, 
be it individuals, corporations, business firms, minorities and indigenous peoples, non-
governmental organizations and inter-governmental organizations.176  
 
In fact, throughout its history, the amicus device has been used as an inherently 
flexible judicial instrument to overcome the shortcomings of its common law 
adversarial litigation process.177 It is owing to its flexibility and organic nature that this 
institution has been used as a critical ‘tool to surpass the limitations placed on the 
court by an adversarial system.’178 The emergence of amici curiae in international 
litigation bears the potential to disrupt, but also to reconceptualise, the traditional 
litigation dynamic.  
The resulting change is part of what has been broadly described as a shift from a 
private view towards a more public or constitutional concept of international law, from 
sovereignty towards community.179 In Order concerning the Declaration of Intervention 
by New Zealand in the Whaling case,180 Judge Cançado Trindade states in his 
Separate Opinion that: 
Intervention in legal proceedings, by providing additional elements to the Court for its 
consideration and reasoning, can contribute to the progressive development of international 
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law itself, especially when matters of collective or common interest and collective guarantee 
are at stake.181  
Similarly, writers are broadly agreed that the amicus procedure offers an important 
opportunity – indeed, often the only opportunity – for non-parties to participate in 
judicial proceedings that have implications for community interests.182 Amicus 
intervenors apprise the tribunal of the broad-based social, economic and legal 
implications of an anticipated case outcome.183 Comparato contends that the two most 
important sources of information vital for judicial decision-making are information 
received from the record parties and information obtained from amici curiae.184 As 
seen earlier, the involvement of amici curiae in international litigation represents a 
critical shift, from the adversarial justice system to a more inclusive and outward-
looking justice system.185 In this connection, Barker notes: 
This device represents the prime departure from the traditional adversary system of justice. No 
longer is the system characterized by its triangular-like structure with the contesting parties at 
the base and the court at the apex. If anything, the structure would more accurately be 
described as “multi-sided” since through the amicus technique, many more than just the 
immediate adversaries enter the judicial forum.186 
The admission of the disparate perspectives of non-parties to be heard in a case goes 
to show that the understanding of judicial decisions as acts that are binding only inter 
partes is woefully inadequate in human rights litigation. This is because human rights 
claims concern society as a collective and direct stakeholder.187 Decisions of courts 
are therefore social artefacts, with a bearing on society at large. It has often been 
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contended that what may ex facie appear to be individual interests in a claim actually 
mask an underlying community value.188  
 
But most importantly, it is not only direct parties to the suit that may desire to participate 
in litigation to enforce human rights norms, but members of the public likely to be 
affected by the expected court decision as well. In a nutshell, the adversarial approach 
is extremely individualistic, promotes an atomistic concept of justice, incapable of 
accommodating the legitimate and expansive claims and demands of the collective, 
and is seemingly impervious to change. Shelton notes that: 
 
The amount of litigation has steadily increased in all international courts. Human rights cases, 
in particular, are growing in number and being litigated in all tribunals, not only those 
established specifically for that purpose. In addition, new issues of widespread concern, such 
as environmental cases, are being presented for decision. In this litigation framework, issues 
of broad public interest can and do arise apart from the questions submitted to courts by the 
parties or by international institutions. Rarely is international litigation a matter of private 
concern or interest affecting only the parties.189 
 
Seen in this light, the admission of amicus curiae mitigates the rigours of bipolarism 
and stresses the ‘publicness’ of international law by asserting that contemporary 
international litigation is supposed to regulate and advance interests that lie beyond 
those of the parties to the suit.’190 The concept of ‘publicness’ has do to with a change 
in the manner in which the law and its systems are perceived by the public.191  
 
Thus, Waldron argues that the public character of law is to be discerned from the fact 
that the law presents itself not just as a set of rules formulated by the elites, but as a 
set of norms publicly given in the name of the public, so that ordinary people can claim 
it as their own.192 In essence, what this study calls for is a non-hegemonic participation 
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of private interests in the litigation process. This school of thought draws its essence 
from the ideal of collective deliberation postulated by transjudicialism theories and on 
the deep-seated uneasiness arising from the ICJ’s reticence towards the admission of 
private intervenors.193  
 
2.7 Implications of amicus interventions for the positivist voluntarist 
international legal order. 
 
The ever-increasing presesence of civil society in the international legal order is 
testimony to the fact that non-state actors are going to become vital counterparts to 
the community of states, which have dominated the international scene for decades.194 
It is becoming evident that international relations ‘are increasingly shaped not only by 
the states themselves, but also by an expanding array of non-State actors on the 
international scene.’195 It is argued, therefore, that the participation of amicus curiae in 
international litigation directly correlates with an enhanced international legal status of 
the individual and the individual’s role in the creation and development of international 
law and policy.  
 
The increasing acknowledgment of individuals as subjects of international law raises 
questions about whether or not their position in international law can be strengthened 
by affording them the opportunity to articulate their views before international courts 
and tribunals.196 Indeed, some writers have argued that the participation of NGOs and 
other organised interests in international law has found an unmistakable manifestation 
in the active use of amicus briefs in international litigation.197 According to Shelton: 
 
International courts are developing innovative practices to take broader public concerns into 
consideration. One positive development is the acceptance of amicus participation by non-
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governmental organizations in international cases, a manifestation of the growing role of non-
state actors in international law generally.198  
Arguing along the same lines, Hollis notes that ‘the participation by private actors as 
amici in international dispute settlement is consistent with the practice of private actor 
participation in [international litigation in particular] and international law 
generally…’199  While the involvement of these entities, especially NGOs, in norm-
setting and policy development is not a new phenomenon, their role and influence has 
steadily increased. This is especially true in the areas of human rights and 
environmental law, which have received the greatest number of amicus curiae 
submissions.200 
As is the case with all non-state actors, the involvement of amici curiae in international 
litigation signals a shift in the concept of international law itself away from the Hegelian 
and neo-Hegelian understandings. These concepts posit that the state is prior to the 
individual, and that it is the solemn and the final repository of the aggregate of the 
freedoms and responsibilities of the individuals who constitute it.201  The rise of amici 
curiae in the international legal order does not fit the état providence paradigm.202 As 
Eckersley forcefully argues, the involvement of amicus entities before multilateral 
adjudicative bodies serves to ‘loosen the view that only states are the legitimate 
authors, addressees and interpreters of international … law.’203  
Calliess and Renner relevantly point out that the amicus mechanism allows 
intervenors to ‘find ways to voice their concerns in the very places where law beyond 
the state is made.’204  The overall consequence of the participation of non-state actors 
in the international legal system is arguably clear: ‘they are de-hierarching and 
flattening the existing international structures of government and their consequent 
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juridical arrangements.’205 To buttress the status of the individual in the modern 
international legal order, many if not all international judicial bodies allow individuals, 
organisations and groups to participate in their litigation as amicus curiae.  
Human rights courts are the poster children for this practice. Although this procedure 
does not amount to the ability to espouse an international claim, it offers significant 
possibilities to mitigate the rigours of statism and the associated bilateralism and 
therefore influences the development of international law as a self-conscious legal 
system. Today, the general attitude of most courts is that in cases dealing with 
questions of important public interest, leave is usually granted to non-parties to file 
amicus briefs unless there are weighty countervailing considerations.  
After examining the role that NGOs play before international courts and compliance 
bodies, Lindblom reports that states are increasingly institutionalising the involvement 
of organised interests in international decision-making.206 These developments are 
born out of the realisation that legal positivism, which promotes bilateralism and state 
voluntarism and insists on locking out non-state actors from the operations of 
international law, is unworkable. Mohamed strenuously argues in the context of the 
African Court that this body ‘would have to come to terms with the fact that adherence 
to the statist paradigm of international law would do a lot of harm to its adjudication of 
human rights.’207 This author expressed the opinion further that ‘…that paradigm no 
longer occupies a place of honour under international human rights law.’208 This writer 
concluded that if the Court does not permit the participation of individuals, NGOs and 
groups, it might be guilty of sticking to a dated conception of human rights 
adjudication.209  
 
The old Roman law maxim hominum causa omne jus consitutum est (all law is made 
for the benefit of mankind, and not vice versa) is gaining credence on the international 
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plane.210 However, some writers have decried the fact that the participation of amici 
curiae in international fora undermines state sovereignty, which, as is well known, has 
served as the central tenet of international law since the conclusion of the treaties of 
Westphalia.211 Contrarily, Hollis argues that it is inaccurate to consider amicus 
involvement in international litigation as supplanting or eroding ‘state sovereignty in 
some zero-sum game paradigm,’ remarking instead that ‘this can be seen as affirming 
sovereignty's continuing vitality.’212 According to this author, this is because both law-
making authorities of international law and the incidence of private actor participation 
occurred in the first place, and subsist to this day, with the consent of states.213 
 
For Kamminga, the fears about the impact of private actor participation on the 
sovereignty of states are exaggerated since the formal status of NGOs and other 
organised private interests in international law is still weak.214 Notwithstanding these 
concerns, the involvement of non-state actors as amici curiae in international litigation 
underlines the on-going transformation of the entire international legal order from 
being a silo of states to a cosmopolitan scene with a place for the individual who in the 
past decades has ‘evolved from an illegitimate child to a well-accepted family member 
of international law.’215  
Although states and, to a comparatively lesser extent, their agencies such as 
multilateral organisations create, implement and enforce international law, civil society 
plays a critical role in that process as well.216 Considering the activities of non-state 
actors, particularly NGOs, one is able to find credible evidence of some influence both 
in the development and application of international law, albeit one that is lesser than 
that of states and inter-governmental organisations.217 They achieve this in part 
through the submission of amicus briefs before international adjudicative bodies. 
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As stated earlier, the doctrinal basis for this development can best be explained 
through the attenuated emphasis on state sovereignty and the greater recognition and 
acknowledgment of individuals and civil society as rights bearers and subjects of 
international law.218 Overall, the role of the amicus participation in the African human 
rights system must thus be seen in the broader context of the growing participation of 
private actors in international law.  
2.8 Interim conclusion  
In this chapter it has been suggested that the submission of amicus briefs constitutes 
a departure from the orthodox matrix of bilateral and adversarial litigation. This 
conventional approach, which has enduringly dominated international litigation and 
continues to inform the approach of most international courts and tribunals in their 
adjudicative tasks, is anachronistic and outmoded. It limits the possibility of third party 
intervention and thus circumscribes the frontiers of truth in litigation. There is an 
intrinsic contradiction between the purpose of truth seeking on the one hand and the 
exclusion of other potential sources of relevant truth, beside record parties, on the 
other.  
In particular, the bilateral model of litigation is inappropriate for international human 
rights law litigation, which seldom fits into a bilateral legal setting, particularly given the 
public interest character of human rights disputes.219 To position collective interests in 
a bilateralist litigation process would be akin to putting a square peg in a round hole. 
Today, it is widely acknowledged that decisions of international courts and tribunals 
not only affect the direct parties to the suit and their immediate interests but also 
increasingly the rights and obligations of third parties. As such, justice demands that 
NGOs representing the public interest be afforded an opportunity to offer information 
and arguments to these bodies.  
It is therefore inarguable that the bilateralist model of international litigation should be 
re-conceptualised in order to give effect to this commitment.220 As argued throughout 
the chapter, the retreat of bilateralism or adversarialism can be achieved in part by 
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adopting a more flexible stance towards the admission of amicus curiae in international 
judicial decision-making processes. This will undoubtedly go a long way towards 
reconceptualising and reconfiguring international litigation from a bilateral enterprise 
to a multi-party process that accommodates public interest.  
The chapter has also stressed that the participation of amici curiae in international 
judicial proceedings is emblematic of the growing role of non-state actors in the field 
of international law. This development reflects an expanding range of private entities, 
in particular NGOs and individuals.221 Individuals may presently not be participating in 
the international legal order to the same extent as states, but the trend is unmistakably 
clear: the role of individuals in the international legal system is rapidly expanding, often 
against the will and wishes of states.222 Indeed, Former Justice Buergenthal is correct 
when he remarks that:  
The acceptance of the notion that individuals have rights enforceable on the international plane 
without the intervention of their state of nationality [has] played havoc with certain basic 
international law principles and assumptions. A legal system developed over centuries to 
regulate relations between states must make considerable conceptual adjustments to 
accommodate the extension of its normative reach to individuals.223 
As Friedmann notes, the heyday of the statist paradigm and bilateral system of 
international law is slowly receding into the horizon.224 The new jus gentium is 
gradually liberating itself from the shackles of statism. The palpably neat and bright 
lines of the bilateral system are blurring: the circle of international actors is gradually 
expanding and the juridical distinction between direct parties and intervening non-
parties is becoming less significant.225 More critically, the participation of amici curiae 
in international litigation firms up the position of the individual as an actor in the 
international legal order which has become an irreversible reality.  
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CHAPTER 3 
AMICI CURIAE PARTICIPATION BEFORE SELECT PEER JURISDICTIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of amicus participation before select peer 
international courts and tribunals, and does so without any pretence of 
comprehensiveness. These courts and tribunals include the ICJ, the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), international criminal courts and tribunals, 
WTO tribunals and investment dispute settlement bodies as well as counterpart 
regional human rights courts. These mechanisms are dealt with principally on the 
basis of their varying approaches to amicus participation. For instance, while the ICJ 
and ITLOS are obstinately reticent towards amicus intervention, international criminal 
and regional human rights mechanisms have adopted a flexible approach towards the 
admission of amici curiae.  
 
Although the present study is not comparative per se, it is important to reflect on the 
amicus practices, experiences, insights and lessons drawn from other international 
courts and tribunals. This approach helps to give a clearer and better picture of the 
amicus practice in international judicial decision making, as opposed to a 
monochromatic approach that focuses solely on the African regional system and 
denies the study an eclectic outlook.  Despite the fact that the amicus curiae has its 
roots in domestic law, it is now deeply interlaced into the fabric of modern international 
judicial practice.1  
 
Since the late 1990s, a notable increase in the acceptance of amicus briefs has been 
evident across international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.2 This trend has been 
variously described as ‘one of the most important evolutions weathered by 
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international law in recent decades,’3 and a ‘golden age of civil society participation’ in 
international litigation.4 In fact, it has been said that ‘procedures allowing NGO amicus 
curiae briefs are currently more a norm than an exception in international judicial 
proceedings’.5 The booming of NGO participation in international litigation has led one 
writer to remark that ‘maybe there is an emergence of a customary international rule 
which allows for the submissions of amicus curiae briefs.’6  
 
To fully understand the phenomenon of amicus activity in international law, it is 
important to understand its domestic development and its ultimate migration into the 
international legal system. It has been pointed out that the migration of legal concepts 
and principles between domestic, regional and international legal orders has been a 
critical factor in the progressive development of international law.7  
 
3.2 Domestic origins of amicus curiae  
 
A historical account of the amicus curiae is useful as the ‘“blocking in” of historical 
material will add contextual depth and analysis, and this will subserve and feed into 
the generation of theoretical ideas about the contemporary situation.’8 The notion of 
an amicus curiae is not new to the world of law or jurisprudence.9 Like many practices 
of the age of antiquity, the roots of the amicus curiae are contested among writers.10 
There is a community of legal writers which believes that the amicus curiae originates 
in Roman law, while other writers contend that the amicus curiae is a common law 
creature. We turn to discuss these accounts and the subsequent spread of the amicus 
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device to other domestic jurisdictions as well as its migration to the international legal 
system. 
 
3.2.1 Roman law traditions 
 
Some writers believe that the amicus curiae owes its origins to ancient classical 
Roman Law which empowered a judge to appoint a consilium magistratum or simply 
a consilium (an officer of the court) or a group of independent experts comprising of 
eminent jurists and priests selected by the judge to assist the court with non-binding 
opinions when doubtful or mistaken about a question of law.11  The judge, often 
appointed from the dominant upper class of the Roman Republic, did not need to have 
a legal background or training.12 Despite this, he was expected to know the law and 
apply it to cases. He therefore could, at his discretion, seek assistance from the 
consilium to complement the submissions of the parties.13 Throughout the life of the 
Roman Empire, this procedure was formalized, and in the late Empire, each official 
performing adjudicatory functions was supported by a salaried advesor.14  
The consilium magistratum influenced the establishment of the advisory council for the 
emperors called the consilium principis by Emperor Augustus.15 The members of the 
consilium principis were at times referred to as the amici principis, a concept that is 
believed to have had etymological and conceptual influence on the development of 
the modern day amicus curiae.16 The term amicus was also used in official documents 
as a designation for public officials such as procurators and provincial governors to 
signify the esteem attached to their offices as representatives of the emperor.17 
Literature subscribing to this genealogy takes the view that the amicus practice was 
subsequently introduced into the common law as a legal transplant.18 
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The endurance of the amicus from the early Roman times in the fourteenth century to 
the present day, without falling obsolete like many Roman law concepts, can be 
attributed in part to its flexibility, which has allowed it to adapt and remain responsive 
to the ever-changing conditions of the universe of litigation. As Lowman points out, 
‘the history of the amicus device hinges on a single principle: flexibility’.19 It is also on 
account of its original characteristics of dynamism, versatility, flexibility, and 
adaptability that it found root in the international field, where it was previously 
unknown, and its use is increasing steadily. 
3.2.2 Common law traditions 
 
Some writers find fault lines in the above historical account that traces the amicus 
institution to Roman Law and claim that the amicus curiae is a creature of the English 
Common Law.20 For instance, Covey disputes the Roman law lineage of amicus curiae 
on at least two grounds: first, he argues that the consilium could not appear before the 
court on its own initiative, as the amicus curiae does today, but could act only at the 
special behest of the court.21 Second, he points out that when requested by the court, 
the consilium could prosecute a criminal defendant, while an amicus cannot act 
against a criminal defendant.22 According to him, ‘[t]hese differences raise a serious 
doubt to the contention that the amicus practice is merely an off-shoot of the Roman 
consilium practice.’23 
Covey also reminds us that from the Early Common Law to the Middle Middle Common 
Law ages, persons facing serious criminal charges, such as treason or felony against 
the Crown, were denied the benefit of legal representatives.24 This notwithstanding, 
such criminal defendants were accorded protection from any errors of law, and unless 
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they were a lawyer themselves, they would be unable to properly advise themselves 
about such errors of law. It is thus probable, so the argument proceeds, that the amicus 
practice, or at least a facet of it, emerged to fill this gap.25 Since an error of the law 
would be beyond the notice of the court (for if it were within its notice, it could remedy 
it itself), the amicus curiae could not lie supine to be asked for his advice like the 
consilium, but should be able to offer it to the court unsolicited.26  
Covey argues that the common law practice of allowing any person present in the 
courtroom to come up front as an amicus curiae to provide the court with legal 
information that was beyond it is ‘as old as the reported cases themselves.’27 He points 
out that Year Book cases dating as far back as 1353 contain evidence of amicus 
interventions as an accepted practice.28 Although Covey makes the claim that his 
theory finds some justification in the works of early writers, he does not cite any such 
writer to support that claim. Neither has diligent research by the present author yielded 
any writings that support Covey’s theory, making it open to doubt.  
The fact that the present-day amicus curiae is substantially and functionally different 
from the Roman consilium does not preclude the possibility that the consilium practice 
has transmogrified over time to become the amicus curiae as we know it today. In 
other words, it is possible that the present amicus curiae could be an evolutionary 
upshot of the Roman consilium that was later introduced into the Common Law. 
Although it is unclear as to when the English courts began to admit amicus briefs, 
Krislov states that the participation of amicus curiae in public law started to appear in 
English law reports in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.29  
As at Roman law, amici did not need to have a background in law to intervene in 
common law courts, and their general attitude was to embrace such interventions 
since ‘it is for the honour of a court of justice to avoid error.’30 The functions of amici 
curiae at common law included, ‘instructing, warning, informing, and moving the 
court.’31 In one interesting case, one Sir George Treby, who was in court during the 
hearing of a case, stood to inform the court that he was present in parliament when a 
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statute whose meaning was in contest was passed, and as amicus curiae, offered to 
inform the court as to the intent of parliament when it passed the legislation in 
question.32  
3.2.3 American legal system 
 
While it is broadly accepted that the roots of the amicus curiae are traceable to Roman 
law, the institution was developed before the English courts and reached full flower 
before the Courts of the US.33 According to Covey, by historical serendipity, ‘the 
amicus practice crossed the Atlantic with the first lawyer to bring his Coke’s 
Institutes.’34 Other writers argue that it is the pervasive influence of the common law 
in the American legal system that led to the transposition of the amicus concept into 
the jurisprudence of the US.35  However, it was not until 1932 in Greed v Biddle36 that 
the Supreme Court of the US finally allowed the intervention of an amicus curiae in its 
litigation.37 The first NGO to appear in an amicus capacity in the litigation of the US 
Supreme Court was the Chinese Charitable and Benevolent Association of New York 
in the 1904 case of Ah How (alias Louie Ah How) v US.38  
Rule 37 of the Supreme Court Rules requires organisations and individuals who desire 
to file amicus briefs to seek the consent of the parties to the suit (save for the federal 
government and respective states, who are exempted from seeking consent).39 In 
practice, the vast majority of litigants before the Supreme Court file a ‘blanket consent’, 
and leave for intervention is granted as a matter of course.40 Correspondingly, the 
Supreme Court has also developed an open-door policy and allows ‘… essentially 
unlimited amicus participation.’41 This has resulted in an explosive dynamic of amicus 
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